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Code of Civil Procedure § 1141.19.5 (new); §§ 664.6, 1141.18,
1282, 1286.2 (amended).
SB 252 (Kopp); 1993 STAT. Ch. 768
Under existing law, a court may enter a judgment' in a civil action,
pursuant to an agreement between the parties to settle the dispute, in
accordance with the oral or written stipulation of the parties made before
the court.2 Chapter 768 revises this practice to allow a court to enter
judgment in accordance with a writing executed by the parties outside of
court or an oral statement made on the court record. At the request of the
parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over enforcement of the settlement
agreement.4
Existing law regulates the grounds on which a judge may be
disqualified from hearing a particular case.5 Chapter 768 extends specified
1. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 577 (West 1976) (defining judgment as the final determination of the
rights of the parties in an action or proceeding); id. § 664.5(c) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that a judgment
includes any judgment, decree, or signed order from which an appeal lies). See generally 7 B.E. WITKIN,
CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Judgment § 1 (3d ed. 1985) (outlining the general meaning of judgment).
2. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 664.6 (amended by Chapter 768); see California State Ass'n Inter-Ins.
Bureau v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 658, 664, 788 P.2d 1156, 1159, 268 Cal. Rptr. 284, 287 (1990) (holding
that a stipulated judgment pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6 is indeed a judgment, and is
therefore a judicial act within the court's discretion); Diaz v. May, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1268, 1275, 19 Cal. Rptr.
2d 409, 413 (1993) (ruling that a stipulation is valid against the parties to an action if signed by a representing
attorney); Datatronic Sys. Corp. v. Speron, Inc., 176 Cal. App. 3d 1168, 1173, 222 Cal. Rptr. 658, 661 (1986)
(requiring that an oral stipulation be made in a judicially supervised proceeding to be valid, and holding that a
stipulation recorded by a court reporter in a deposition does not constitute a valid stipulation).
3. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 664.6 (amended by Chapter 768). But see ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON
JUDICIARY, CoMMiTrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 252, at 4-5, (July 14, 1993) (discussing the problems associated with
allowing an oral stipulation made before an arbitrator to constitute a judgment because of the absence of a
formal record at arbitration proceedings). See generally SUSAN M. LEESON & BRYAN M. JOHNSON, ENDING IT:
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AMERICA 77-86 (1988) (outlining the general provisions of court annexed arbitration).
4. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 664.6 (amended by Chapter 768).
5. Id. § 170.1 (West Supp. 1993); see id. (stating that a judge shall be disqualified if: (1) The judge has
personal knowledge of the facts of a case; (2) the judge has acted as a lawyer in the same or similar proceeding;
(3) the judge has a financial interest in the matter; (4) the judge, spouse, or person with which the judge or
judge's spouse has a close relation is a representative of a party; (5) the judge or judge's spouse is involved
professionally with a lawyer in the action; (6) the judge believes that his or her withdrawal would serve the
interests of justice; or (7) the judge suffers from an impairment that would make it difficult for that judge to
perceive the evidence); Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 3d 403, 408, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 40, 43-44 (1985) (adhering to the objective test developed in United Mine Workers of America v. Superior
Court, infra, by holding that a judge will not be disqualified if the average person on the street would find no
factual basis for believing that the judge is not able to act impartially); United Farm Workers of America v.
Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 97, 103, 216 Cal. Rptr. 4, 8-10 (1985) (stating that California Code of Civil
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grounds for judicial disqualification to cover arbitrators who are operating
under a judicial or private arbitration agreement.6 Chapter 768 requires the
court to vacate an arbitration award if the arbitrator fails to disqualify
himself or herself, as required by the specified provisions, upon timely
request by the parties.7
Existing law limits pre-trial discovery, of a defendant's financial status,
unless specifically allowed by a court order based upon a finding of
substantial probability that the plaintiff's punitive damages claim will be
Procedure § 170.1(a)(6)(A) imposes an objective standard that requires judges to disqualify themselves from a
proceeding if a reasonable person would believe that they could not be impartial); 75 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 58
(1992) (opining that judges are not required to disqualify themselves from handling a criminal master calendar
if they or their spouses have served as or represented police officers in the past; however, disqualification is
required if the judge or the judge's spouse is substantially involved in the case or the judge personally believes
that he or she can not rule impartially); see also DAVID M. ROTHMAN, CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL CONDUCT
HANDBOOK, CANON 3C (1990) (summarizing the applicable ethical and statutory guidelines that govern when
a judge shall be disqualified).
6. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.18(d) (amended by Chapter 768); see SENATE CO,1tMITnEE ON
JUDICIARY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 252, at 2-3 (May 18, 1993) (declaring that the purpose of Chapter 768
is to hold arbitrators to the same standards as judges to ensure that parties to an arbitration proceeding receive
a fair and impartial hearing). But see Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145,
150 (1968) (White, J., concurring) (clarifying the holding of the court as not to hold arbitrators to the same
standards that judges are held to because of the negative effect it would have on the arbitration process, since
it would disqualify the most qualified arbitrators).
7. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2(0 (amended by Chapter 768); see id. § 1141.18(d) tamended by
Chapter 768) (requiring that all objections made pursuant to § 170.6 be made within five days after the arbitrator
has been named). Objections based on § 170.1 can be made any time prior to the conclusion of the arbitration
proceedings. Id.; see id. § 1286.2(a)-(f) (amended by Chapter 768) (authorizing the court to vacate an award if*
(a) The award was reached through corruption or fraud; (b) any arbitrator involved in the award was corrupt;
(c) the arbitrator's misconduct substantially prejudiced the rights of any of the parties; (d) an excess of power
demonstrated by the arbitrator can not be corrected without affecting the decision on the merits; (e) the failure
of the arbitrator to postpone the hearing or refuse to hear evidence upon a showing of good cause substantially
prejudiced the rights of any of the parties; or, (f) the arbitrator failed to disqualify him or herself although
subject to disqualification pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 1282(e)). California Code of Civil
Procedure § 1286.2(0 does not apply to arbitration proceedings governed by a collective agreement between
employers and employees. Id. § 1286.2(0 (amended by Chapter 768).
Pacific Law Journal/Vol. 25
Civil Procedure
granted. Chapter 768 provides that the same limits will apply to
arbitration proceedings.9
All arbitration hearings conducted pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement between an employer and employee are exempt from the
provisions of Chapter 768.10
SMK
Civil Procedure; attorney fees for prevailing plaintiffs
Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 (amended).
SB 9 (Lockyer); 1993 STAT. Ch. 1239
Existing law specifies that a cause of action arising against a person for
an act in furtherance of that person's right of petition' or free speech in
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295(c) (West Supp. 1993); see Rawnsley v. Superior Court, 183 Cal. App. 86,
91,227 Cal. Rptr. 806, 809 (1986) (explaining that the purpose of California Civil Code § 3295(c) is to provide
a safeguard against claims for punitive damages, unrelated to the primary claim, and filed for the sole purpose
of forcing the responding party to expend time and money assessing a damage award that may never
materialize); Martin v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 3d 391,394-95, 167 Cal. Rptr. 811, 813 (1980) (following
the holding in Richards v. Superior Court, infra, and recognizing that punitive damage claims and pre-trial
discovery of a party's financial condition are methods often used solely to burden the responding party and to
force a settlement); Cobb v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 543, 550, 160 Cal. Rptr. 561, 566 (1979) (holding
that a trial court should reserve the right to require, under appropriate circumstances, that a party filing a punitive
damages claim make a prima facie showing in support of the party's case before allowing pre-trial discovery
of the defendant's financial condition); Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 265, 272, 150 Cal. Rptr.
77, 81 (1978) (concluding that pre-trial discovery of a party's financial status, pursuant to a claim for punitive
damages, is limited to information that is relevant to the substantive claim and is then only revealed to counsel
and only for purposes related to the lawsuit); IRA A. BROWN & ROBERT I. WEIL, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE:
CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 8:339.4 (1993) (opining that the substantial probability requirement
referenced in California Civil Code § 3295(c) can be satisfied with "at least enough evidence to get a motion
for nonsuit"); 2 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 1622-23 (3rd ed. 1986 & Supp. 1993) (explaining the
application of California Civil Code § 3295(c) to pre-trial discovery of a party's financial condition); Review
of Selected 1979 California Legislation, 11 PAC. L.J. 352, 352-53 (1979) (outlining the existing case and
statutory law, and the legislative intent behind the introduction of California Civil Code § 3295(c)). See generally
6 B.E. WITKIN, SUIMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts, § 1376 (9th ed. 1988) (summarizing the relevant case
law interpreting discovery of a defendant's financial condition predating the passage of California Civil Code
§ 3295(c))
9. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.19.5 (enacted by Chapter 768); see SENATE COMMrrrEE ON
JUDICIARY, ComIiTrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 252, at 3 (May 18, 1993) (explaining that SB 252 would conform pre-
trial discovery procedures in arbitrations to those followed in judicial proceedings).
10. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282(e) (amended by Chapter 768); id. § 1286.2(f) (amended by Chapter
768).




relation to a public issue will be subject to a special motion to strike,2
unless the court determines there is a possibility the plaintiff may prevail
on the claim. Existing law further requires that a prevailing defendant
recover attorney's fees and costs on a motion to strike.4 Prevailing
2. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 435 (West Supp. 1993) (setting forth procedures for a notice of motion
to strike the whole or part of a complaint).
3. Id. § 425.16(b) (amended by Chapter 1239); see United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657,
670 (1965) (stating that Noerr, protects from the Sherman Act a collective effort to influence public officials
regardless of intent or purpose); Eastern Rail Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-
38 (1961) (providing that the right to petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, therefore,
in a representative democracy such as the United States, the branches of government act on behalf of the people,
and the concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people to make their wishes known to the
representatives); Hotel St. George Ass'n v. Morgenstern, 819 F. Supp. 310, 323 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting
that the tactic of suing community groups and their members to stifle the legitimate expression of opinion to
the government has acquired the acronym "SLAPP suit," otherwise known as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation); Westfield Partners Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523, 525-26 (N.D. I1. 1990) (discussing SLAPP
suits under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine which have been used to protect citizens communications with the
government in a wide variety of cases); Florida Fern Growers Ass'n Inc. v. Concerned Citizens of Putnam
County, 616 So. 2d 562, 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing that the term SLAPP was coined by two
University of Denver professors, George W. Pring and Penelope Canan, who defined SLAPP suits as those
which punish political opponents for past behavior in an attempt to preclude their future effectiveness and to
warn others that political opposition will be punished); 600 West 115th St. Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 603 N.E.2d
930, 933 n.l (N.Y. 1992) (characterizing SLAPP suits as actions that have been filed with little legal merit in
order to burden opponents with legal defense costs and the threat of liability, and to discourage those who might
wish to speak out in the future), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2341 (1993); ASSEMBLY SUBCOMhiTrEe ON THE
ADMINISTRATION ON JUSTICE, ANALYSIS OF SB 1264, at 4 (July 1, 1992) (discussing the effect of SLAPP suits,
which are allegedly brought by large commercial interests to deter citizens from becoming involved in the
political process); Canan & Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 35 Soc. PROIIS. 506, 506
(1988) (noting attempts to use civil tort action to stifle political expression and how such lawsuits affect political
values and participation in American society); Thomas A. Waldman, Comment, SLAPP Suits: Weaknesses in
First Amendment Laws and in the Courts' Responses to Frivolous Litigation, 39 UCLA L. REV. 979, 984 (1992)
(listing several characteristics of SLAPP suits: (1) The most frequent claim asserted in a SLAPP suit is
defamation or business torts; (2) suits are characterized by prayers for damage awards that are large in
comparison to the resources of the defendant; (3) the defendant to a SLAPP suit will bear considerable legal
costs which often discourage petitioning, even assuming the SLAPP plaintiffs do not prevail; and (4) describing
SLAPP suits as frivolous). SLAPP suits may be dismissed under the Noer-Pennington doctrine which protects
the right to petition the government for redress. Id. at 983. Laura J. Ericson-Siegal, Review of Florida
Legislation; Conuent: Silencing SLAPPs: An Examination of Proposed Legislative Remedies and a "Solution"
for Florida, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 487, 489 (1992) (stating that SLAPPs are attracting attention in Florida and
a study by the Attorney General's staff identified at least 18 suits that could be characterized as SLAPPs). See
generally Getting SLAPPed: An Ansver to Malicious Lawsuits Against Activists, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept.
3, 1992, at B12 (setting forth recent examples of SLAPP suits); Thomas Scheffey, SLAPP Remedy Assailed as
Worse than the Disease, CONN. L. TRIB., Mar. 29, 1993, at 8 (discussing pending legislation designed to prevent
SLAPP suits); Todd Woody, Agency SLAPPed With Large Fee Request; Environmentalist Who Was Awarded
$205,000 Now Seeks $700,000for His Counsel, THE RECORDER, Dec. 21, 1992, at 3 (stating how a federal jury
awarded Alan La Pointe $205,100 after concluding the county agency violated his First Amendment rights by
filing a SLAPP suit against him).
4. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c) (amended by Chapter 1239); see FED. R. Civ. P. I 1 (stating that
the court may order a party to pay the other party's reasonable expenses if the pleading, motion, or other paper
was interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needless increase in
the cost of litigation); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (\Vest 1980) (providing that a court may award attorney's
fees to a successful party against an opposing party in an action which has resulted in the enforcement of
Pacific Law Journal/Vol. 25
Civil Procedure
plaintiffs are permitted to recover attorney fees and costs if the court
determines the motion was frivolous5 or intended to cause unnecessary
delay.6
Chapter 1239 imposes a mandatory rather than permissive recovery of
attorney's fees and costs by a prevailing plaintiff if the motion was
frivolous or intended to cause unnecessary delay.7
MBB
important rights affecting the public interest); Chambers v. Nasco Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2132-33 (1991)
(providing that the district court has inherent authority, among other things, to sanction parties appearing before
it for acting in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons).
5. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5(b)(2) (West Supp. 1993) (defining frivolous as totally and
completely without merit, or for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party).
6. Id. § 425.16(c) (amended by Chapter 1239); see id. § 128.5 (West Supp. 1993) (setting forth order
for payment of expenses for frivolous actions or delaying tactics). See generally Southern Christian Leadership
Conf. v. Al Malaikah Auditorium Co., 230 Cal. App. 3d 207, 227, 281 Cal. Rptr. 216, 229 (1991) (stating that
under California Code of Civil Procedure § 128.5, the trial court may order a party, and/or the party's attorney
to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorney fees incurred by another party as a result of a bad faith
action, or tactics that are frivolous or intended to cause unnecessary delay); Young v. Rosenthal, 212 Cal. App.
3d 96, 122-23, 260 Cal. Rptr. 369, 385 (1989) (stating that defendant's motion to vacate stipulation was made
in bad faith without substantial justification; therefore, it was frivolous and warranted sanctions), review denied,
1989 Cal. LEXIS 2534 (Oct. 11, 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1080 (1990); Joseph J. Brecher, The Public
Interest and Intimidation Suits: A New Approach, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105, 132-33 (1988) (providing that
a public interest defendant's eligibility for an award under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5 is
determined by three factors: (1) Whether important rights are vinaicated; (2) whether the general public or large
class of persons benefitted; and (3) whether the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement makes the
award appropriate); Review of Selected 1981 California Legislation, 13 PAC. L.J. 513, 602-03 (1982) (discussing
provisions of the California Code of Civil Procedure intending to reduce meritless litigation by permitting the
awarding of attorney fees to the wronged party).
7. CAL. Ctv. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c) (amended by Chapter 1239); see id. (mandating that the court
shall award costs and attorney fees to the plaintiff prevailing on the motion pursuant to California Code of Civil
Procedure § 128.5); see also id. § 425.16(h) (amended by Chapter 1239) (stating that on or before January 1,
1998, the Judicial Council must report to the Legislature on the frequency, outcome, and other matters
concerning the special motions made pursuant to this section).
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Civil Procedure; attorney's fees
Civil Code § 1714.10 (amended); Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5
(amended).
SB 764 (Kopp); 1993 STAT. Ch. 645
Existing law regulates the procedure for determining when an action
against an attorney for civil conspiracy shall be allowed.' Chapter 645
declares that the special civil proceeding provides any attorney who has
been accused of civil conspiracy the right to appeal any court order as a
final judgment.
2
Under existing law, attorney's fees may be awarded to a prevailing
party3 if the action results in the enforcement of an important public right,
but fees may not be awarded in favor of a public entity against another
public entity.4 Chapter 645 extends the right to receive attorney's fees to
1. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.10(a) (amended by Chapter 645); see id. (providing that before a party can
include a claim of civil conspiracy in a complaint filed against an attorney, the court must enter an order ruling
that the party has established that there is a reasonable probability that the party will prevail on the claim); Hung
v. Wang, 8 Cal. App. 4th 908, 920, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113, 119 (1992) (stating that the legislative intent behind
California Civil Code § 1714.10 was to provide protection to insurance defense attorneys who were routinely
being threatened with claims that they were conspiring with their clients to avoid reaching settlements, thus
forcing the attorneys to notify their malpractice carriers which resulted in higher premiums regardless of the
validity of the claim); Villa Pac. Bldg. Co. v. Superior Court, 233 Cal. App. 3d 8, 12, 284 Cal. Rptr. 227, 230
(1991) (holding that the protections provided by California Civil Code § 1714.10 are waived by the failure to
plead it at the earliest opportunity).
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.10(d) (amended by Chapter 645); see Hung, 8 Cal. App 4th at 935, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 129 (holding that the procedure developed by California Civil Code § 1714.10 is special, and any
decision concerning the petition is a final, appealable order); see also SENATE COMMITrEE ON JUDICIARY,
COmmIrTrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 764, at 5 (May 18, 1993) (declaring that the role of the Chapter 645 is to codify
the ruling in Hung, and to serve as a declaration of existing law.)
3. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 432 (1983) (holding that a party is prevailing if the party
obtains substantial relief regardless of whether the court adopts each contention raised).
4. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (amended by Chapter 645); see id. (requiring that in addition to the
action enforcing a public right, it must also confer a significant benefit on a large class of persons). The award
is appropriate because of the necessity and the financial burden of private litigation to enforce the bill, and
justice requires that the fees not be paid out of the recovery. Id.; Pacific Legal Found. v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 33 Cal. 3d 158, 167, 655 P.2d 306, 311, 188 Cal. RpIr. 104, 109-10 (1982) (holding that private
property owners who brought an action to strike down a permit condition did not confer a substantial benefit
on the public, and did not qualify for attorney's fees under the Private Attorney General doctrine); Woodland
Hills Residents Ass'n, Inc. v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d 917, 933, 593 P.2d 200, 208, 154 Cal. Rptr. 503, 511
(1979) (holding that California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5 is a codification of the Private Attorney
General doctrine in which the fundamental objective is to encourage private litigants to bring actions advancing
a substantial public benefit, thus conferring a benefit upon a large group of citizens); Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.
3d 25, 45-47, 569 P.2d 1303, 1314-15, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 325-27 (1977) (outlining the substantive provisions
of the Private Attorney General doctrine as awarding fees to a plaintiff attorney who has indicated a public right
that is based in the California Constitution, and the burden of private litigation is out of proportion to the
individual gain); h re Dormio, 127 Cal. App. 3d 788, 793-94, 179 Cal. Rptr. 669, 672 (1981) (rejecting an
award of attorney's fees under the Private Attorney General doctrine to a plaintiff appearing in propria persona);
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public entities provided that the action involves another public entity as an
adversary.5 Fees awarded to public entities pursuant to Chapter 645 will
not be increased or decreased by an extrinsic circumstance multiplier.6
SMK
Fogelson v. Municipal Court, 120 Cal. App. 3d 858, 861-62, 175 Cal. Rptr. 64,65-66(1981) (denying attorney's
fees under California Code of Civil Procedure to a defendant in a criminal proceeding); County of Inyo v. City
of Los Angeles, 78 Cal. App. 3d 82, 89, 144 Cal. Rptr. 71, 76 (1978) (holding that an award of attorney's fees
under the Private Attorney General doctrine is only appropriate when the burden of pursuing private litigation
outweighs the individual's personal benefit); CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARD PRAcTICE § 3.3-3.11 (Cal.
Continuing Educ. Bar 1982 & Supp. 1993) (summarizing the current statutory and case law surrounding the
Private Attorney General doctrine); John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involntary Clients in Public Interest
Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REV. 849, 888-907 (1975) (discussing an outline of the general practice of courts to
award attorney's fees in public interest litigation under the Private Attorney General doctrine); Review of Selected
1977 California Legislation, 9 PAC. L.J. 365, 365-67 (1978) (providing the legislative intent behind California
Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5). See generally Robert L. Weiner, Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the
"Private Attorney General": Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HASTINGS LJ.
733 (1972) (discussing the concept of awarding fees under the Private Attorney General doctrine).
5. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (amended by Chapter 645); see City of Klawock v. Gustafson, 585
F.2d 428,430-31 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that an award of attorney's fees from a common fund to a city against
the trustee for the townsite was permissible and within the district court's discretion); SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS
OF SB 764, at 2 (Aug. 25, 1993) (discussing the unfairness of the provision excluding an award of attorney's
fees to public entities in all circumstances, and instead advocating, in cases where two public entities are
adversaries, an award to the prevailing public entity to enable small public entities to compete with their larger
well-funded counterparts).
6. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (amended by Chapter 645); see id. (stating that the multiplier based
upon extrinsic circumstances, discussed in Serrano v. Priest, does not apply to fees awarded to public entities);
Serrano, 20 Cal. 3d at 49, 569 P.2d at 1316-17, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 328 (discussing the appropriate use of extrinsic
factors to evaluate the adequacy of the award such as: (1) The novelty of the questions involved and the skill
exhibited in presenting them; (2) the extent to which involvement in the lawsuit limited the lawyers from taking
on other projects; (3) the contingent nature of the award; (4) the likelihood that an award against the state would
fall upon the taxpayers; (5) the use of public and charitable funding to bring lawsuits of the nature involved;
(6) the fact that the award will not confer an individual benefit on the attorneys, but instead go to the




Civil Procedure; civil remedies
Business and Professions Code §§ 6086.13, 17204 (amended);
Code of Civil Procedure § 1167.6 (repealed); §§ 575.1, 712.020,
1094.6, 1987.5, 2020, 2025 (amended); Government Code §§ 6259,
26800 (amended).
AB 2205 (Connolly); 1993 STAT. Ch. 926
Chapter 926 is titled the Assembly Committee on Judiciary's Omnibus
Civil Practice bill.'
Prior law provided that the State Bar Court2 issued orders imposing
disbarment or suspension? Chapter 926 changes this provision to reflect
that it is the Supreme Court, not the State Bar Court that issues such
orders.4
Existing law sets forth the method to bring an action for relief for
unfair competition.' Chapter 926 provides that such actions may only be
brought in a court of competent jurisdiction.6
1. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COmMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2205, at 1, (May 19, 1993).
The intent of Chapter 926 is to expedite the review process and eliminate the need to pass a large number of
small bills. Id.; see id. (stating that although the changes made through the expedited process may be minor, they
are important). The Judiciary Committee takes into consideration suggestions received from the bench and Bar
in order to present a single collection of minor civil procedure changes. SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 2205,
at 2 (Aug. 19, 1993); id. (stating that changes instituted by Chapter 926 are more than simply "maintenance of
the codes," but they are not controversial and do not involve significant policy considerations).
2. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6086.5 (Vest 1990) (establishing the State Bar Court to act in
disciplinary and reinstatement proceedings).
3. 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 1270, sec. 1, at 5194 (enacting CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6086.13).
4. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6086.13(a) (amended by Chapter 926); see SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS
OF AB 2205, at 1 (Aug. 19, 1993) (stating that Chapter 926 corrects prior law in order to reflect that the
Supreme Court is the ultimate disciplinary authority). See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (imposing sanctions on
attorneys); People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 176 N.E. 901, 905-06 (111. 1931) (stating that the
Supreme Court of Illinois has inherent power over the practice of law, including the power to discipline
attorneys); Roger A. Silver, The hIherent Power of the Florida Courts, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 257 (1985)
(discussing the inherent power of the Florida Supreme Court over the Florida Bar); Paul Kaufman, Note, A
Prospective Cap on Rule 11 Sanction, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1275 (1991) (discussing the effect of Rule I 1 on the
Federal litigation system); Richard G. Wallace, Comment, Attorney Discipline and the California Supreme
Court: Transfer of Direct Review to the Courts ofAppeal, 72 CAL. L. REV. 252 (1984) (proposing that attorney
disciplinary matters be transferred to the California Supreme Court).
5. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (amended by Chapter 926); see also id. § 17200 (Vest Supp.
1993) (defining unfair competition as any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practice and misleading
advertising). See generally Review of Selected 1991 California Legislation, 23 PAC. L.J. 510, 554-55 (1992)
(discussing legislation regarding unfair competition).
6. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (amended by Chapter 926).
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Existing law provides that superior courts may prepare local rules
designed to expedite and facilitate the business of the court.7 Existing law
also prohibits local rules from being inconsistent with statutory law or
Judicial Council rules.8 Chapter 926 authorizes municipal and justice
courts to follow the same procedures as superior courts in adopting local
rules.9 Chapter 926 states that any rules which apply solely to particular
branches or districts of a court are to be published as part of the general
publication of rules required by the California Rules of Court."0
Existing law provides that the service of a subpoena duces tecum" is
invalid unless a copy of the affidavit is served on the person served with
the subpoena.' 2 Chapter 926 states that this section does not apply to
7. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 575.1(a) (amended by Chapter 926); see id. (stating that proposed rules must
be submitted for consideration to judges of the court, and upon approval by a majority of the judges, to the local
bar for consideration and recommendations before becoming established rules); 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 925,
sec. 2, at 4199 (enacting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 575.6, which allows for counsel appearance by telephone at
trial setting conferences); Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 645 (1987) (stating that any District Court has the
discretion to adopt local rules that are necessary to carry out the conduct of its business); Anchorage Assocs.
v. Board of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 173-74 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that District Courts are authorized to
prescribe rules for the conduct of court business so long as these rules are consistent with Acts of Congress and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd., 764 F. Supp. 328, 333 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
(stating that the District Court may establish or revise local rules only after providing appropriate public notice
and opportunity to comment); see, e.g., L.A. COUNTY Sup. CT. R. Ch. 3 §§ 1-6 (discussing local rules on the
distribution of court business); SACRAMENTO COUNTY SupI. CT. R. 52 (outlining the local rules for trial setting
conferences); SAN DIEGO COUNTY Sup. Cr. R. Div. H 1.1-1.17 (discussing administrative local rules for civil
litigation and case management); S.F. COUNTY Sup. CT. R. 2.12 (outlining local rules for pretrial settlement
conferences); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1988) (allowing the Supreme Court and all other courts established by
an Act of Congress to prescribe rules for conduct of their business); id. § 2071(b) (1988) (stating that courts
must give appropriate public notice and an opportunity for comment before prescribing local rules); id. § 2071(d)
(1988) (requiring copies of local rules to be distributed to the Judicial Council and the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and made available to the public).
8. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 925, sec. 2, at 4199 (amending CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68070(a)); see id.
(stating that local rules could not be inconsistent with statutes or with the rules adopted and prescribed by the
Judicial Council).
9. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 575.1(a) (amended by Chapter 926) see id. § 575.1(b) (amended by Chapter
926) (stating that after the rule is adopted, at least 61 copies are to be filed with the Judicial Council, and a copy
is to be deposited with each county law library and each county clerk for public examination). Each court shall
make its local rules available for inspection and copying in every location of the court that generally accepts
filing of papers, and may charge a reasonable fee and page limit for copying. Id.
10. Id. § 575.1 (c) (amended by Chapter 926); see id. (stating that the rules must be organized sequentially
by court, branch, or district and that these rules are considered local rules for requirements set forth in the
Judicial Council rules applicable to local court rules); see also ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON JUDICIARY,
COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 425, at 1-2 (July 14, 1993) (discussing the changes made to California Code of
Civil Procedure § 575.1 which were ultimately made by Chapter 926; however, the statutory changes under this
section were also proposed by SB 425, but they were superseded by Chapter 926).
11. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1987.5 (amended by Chapter 926) (defining a subpoena duces tecum




deposition subpoenas requiring only the production of business records for
copying.
13
Existing law provides the manner in which deposition subpoenas
requiring only the production of business records for copying may be
delivered. 14 Prior law sets forth options for delivery that the custodian of
the records may choose.'5 Chapter 926 changes the wording of this
subdivision to state that the custodian of the records shall elect one of the
methods. 
16
Existing law specifies the procedure for reading, correcting, and
signing the original transcript of an oral deposition that is stenographically
recorded.17  Chapter 926 revises this procedure to require that the
deposition officer shall send notice to the deponent and to all parties that
the transcript is available when the original transcript for each session is
completed, or if all the parties agree, when the entire deposition is over.' 8
APIMJP
Civil Procedure; common interest developments
Civil Code § 1363 (amended); Code of Civil Procedure §§ 366.2,
411.36 (amended); § 374 (amended and renumbered).
AB 1704 (Horcher); 1993 STAT. Ch. 151
Existing law provides that the managing association' of a common
interest development (CID)2 has standing relating to matters pertaining to
13. Id.; see id. (stating that this section does not apply to subpoenas under § 2020(d)); id. § 2020(d)
(amended by Chapter 926) (setting forth the procedures for obtaining business records for copying).
14. Id. § 2020(d)(l)-(6) (amended by Chapter 926).
15. 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 876, sec. 9, at 3513 (amending CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2020).
16. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2020(d)(4) (amended by Chapter 926).
17. Id. § 2025(q)(1) (amended by Chapter 926).
18. Id. see id. (providing that the reading, correcting, and signing of the transcript may be waived if the
deponent and all the parties agree to do so); ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON JUDICIARY, COm.,lrmE ANALYSIS OF
AB 2205, at 2 (May 19, 1993) (explaining that the State Bar regarded the prior law as ambiguous, and requested
that it be clarified).
1. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1351(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining association as a nonprofit corporation
or unincorporated association created for the purpose of managing a common interest development).
2. See id. § 1351(c) (West Supp. 1993) (defining common interest development as a community
apartment project, a condominium project, a planned development, or a stock cooperative); id. § 135 l(d) (West
Supp. 1993) (defining community apartment project); id. § 1351(0 (West Supp. 1993) (defining condominium
project); id. § 1351(k) (Vest Supp. 1993) (defining planned development); id. § 1351(m) (West Supp. 1993)
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enforcement of governing documents,3 damage to common areas,4 or
damage to, or arising from damage to, separate interests5 or common areas
that the association is obligated to maintain or repair, unless the governing
documents of the association provide otherwise.6 Chapter 151 provides
that these associations have standing without regard to any provisions
contained in the governing documents.7
Existing law provides that, subject to certain provisions relating to
creditor claims8 in the administration of estates of decedents, 9 if an action
survives against a person who dies before the expiration of the applicable
limitations period, the action may be commenced within one year after the
date of death, and no other limitations period applies. 10 Chapter 151
provides that the limitations period is also subject to rules on the payment
of claims, debts,"' and expenses from revocable trusts 2 of deceased
(defining stock cooperative). See generally 7 HARRY D. MILLER & MARVIN B. STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL
ESTATE 2d § 22:10 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing common attributes of all common interest developments).
3. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 13510) (West Supp. 1993) (defining governing documents as the declaration
and any other documents, such as bylaws, operating rules of the association, articles of incorporation, or articles
of association, which govern the operation of the CID or association).
4. See id. § 1351 (b) (West Supp. 1993) (defining the common area as the entire CID except the separate
interests therein).
5. See id. § 1351(1) (West Supp. 1993) (defining separate interest).
6. Id. § 1363(c) (amended by Chapter 151); see Orange Grove Terrace Owners Ass'n v. Bryant
Properties, Inc., 176 Cal. App. 3d 1217, 1222, 222 Cal. Rptr. 523, 526 (1986) (holding that a condominium
owners association had standing to sue a developer for damages to the common areas of the condominium
project caused by the developer prior to formal organization of the association); Del Mar Beach Club Owners
Ass'n, Inc. v. Imperial Contracting Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 898, 906, 176 Cal. Rptr. 886, 890 (1981) (holding
that where individual owners in an apartment building only purchased the "air space" in their units, and the
planned development complex owners association had acquired title to the common areas, real property and
building structures, the association had standing to bring a cause of action); Raven's Cove Townhomes, Inc. v.
Knuppe Development Co., 114 Cal. App. 3d 783, 790-93, 171 Cal. Rptr. 334, 337-39 (1981) (holding that the
owners association had standing to sue for damages for landscaping defects in common areas of a condominium
project, but did not have standing to sue for damages to individually owned condominium units).
7. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 383(a) (amended and renumbered by Chapter 151); see CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1363(c) (amended by Chapter 151) (stating that the association may exercise the powers granted by California
Civil Procedure Code § 383).
8. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 9000 (West 1991) (defining claim).
9. See id. §§ 9000-9399 (West 1991 and Supp. 1993) (outlining creditor claims in the administration
of the estates of decedents).
10. CAL. Ctv. PROC. CODE § 366.2(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 151); see Smith v. Hall, 19 Cal. 85, 86
(1861) (holding that the statute of limitations does not begin to run when no administration of the estate exists
at the time the cause of action accrues); Sacks v. FSR Brokerage, Inc., 7 Cal. App. 4th 950, 956, 9 Cal. Rptr.
2d 306, 309 (1992) (stating that an action or proceeding does not abate by the death of a party if the cause of
action survives or continues, and the action may be maintained against the person's personal representative);
Triplett v. Williams, 269 Cal. App. 2d 135, 137-38, 74 Cal. Rptr. 594, 596 (1969) (stating that the representative
of a decedent has the right to bring an action against a third person who the decedent would have had a right
to bring a claim against within the statute of limitations period).
11. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 19000(f) (West Supp. 1993) (defining debt as all claims, all expenses of
administration, and all other proper charges against the trust estate, including taxes).
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settlors. 13 Chapter 151 provides that the one-year limitations period is not
tolled or extended for any reason.
14
MJP
Civil Procedure; confidentiality of medical information
Civil Code § 56.06 (new); § 56.30 (amended).
AB 336 (Snyder); 1993 STAT. Ch. 1004
Existing law forbids health care providers' from disclosing medical
information2  concerning a provider's patients3  without obtaining
authorization,4 except under certain specified circumstances.' Under
12. See id § 19000(d) (West Supp. 1993) (defining trust as a trust described in California Probate Code
§ 18200, or, if a portion of a trust, that portion that remained subject to the power of revocation at the deceased
settlor's death)
13. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 366.2(b)(2) (amended by Chapter 151); see CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 190D0-
19403 (West Supp. 1993) (outlining the payment of claims, debts, and expenses from revocable trusts of
deceased settlors); id. § 19000(e) (West Supp. 1993) (defining a deceased settlor as a deceased person who, at
the time of his or her death, held the power to revoke the trust in whole or part). See generally BAR
ASSOCIATION OF SAN FRANCISCO, How TO LIVE AND DIE WITH CALIFORNIA PROBATE, ch. 17 at 127 (1970)
(discussing the use of trusts and the difference between revocable and irrevocable trusts); PLANNING &
DRAFTING REVOCABLE TRUSTS 9-29 (Cal. Continuing Educ. Bar 1931) (discussing revocable trusts).
14. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 366.2(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 151); see Berger v. O'Hearn, 41 Cal. 2d
729, 731, 264 P.2d 10. 12 (1953) (stating that generally, in the absence of a specific statute to the contrary, the
intervening death of an obligor does not toll a general statute of limitations upon an accrued cause of action).
Because of the hardship of this rule, many states have enacted statutes which extend the limitation period to give
the creditor an opportunity to bring an action. Id.; J.B. Glen, Annotation, Application and Linits of Rule That
Death of Person Liable Does Not Interrupt Running of Statute of Limitations, 174 A.L.R. 1423 (1948)
(discussing specific states' exceptions and modifications to the general rule which does not allow the tolling of
the statue of limitations on a cause of action against a deceased person).
1. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146(c)(2) (West 1990) (defining health care provider as any person,
clinic, health dispensary, health facility, or legal representative of a health care provider licensed to administer
health care in the ordinary course of business).
2. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.05(b) (West Supp. 1993) (defining medical information as data originating
from a health care provider concerning a patient's medical history).
3. See id. § 56.05(c) (fVest Supp. 1993) (defining patient as an individual, dead or alive, who has been
given medical services from a health care provider).
4. See id. § 56.05(a) (Vest Supp. 1993) (explaining that authorization means permission given to release
medical data); id. § 56.11 (West 1982) (stating that a health care provider has the authority to release medical
data if the authorization: (1) Is handwritten by the individual who signs it or is typed with 8-point type or larger;
(2) is clearly distinct from any other words on the same piece of paper, and is signed for the purpose of granting
the authorization; (3) is signed and dated by the patient, or the patient's legal representative, spouse, beneficiary,
or personal representative; (4) specifies the intended uses and limitations on the types of medical data to be
revealed; (5) indicates the name or functions of the health care provider who may divulge the information; (6)
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existing law, a health care provider who illegally discloses a patient's
medical records6 may be liable for compensatory damages,7  punitive
provides the name or functions of the persons or entities entitled to obtain the data; (7) signifies the uses and
limits placed on those persons or entities entitled to obtain the information; (8) states the date upon which the
data may no longer be disclosed; and (9) apprises the person signing the authorization that that person may
obtain a copy of the authorization).
5. Id. § 56.10(a)-(c)(13) (West Supp. 1993); see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2225 (West Supp. 1993)
(providing that the physician-patient privilege is not applicable to investigative proceedings regarding violations
of the Medical Practice Act, but the authority to examine a patient's records is limited to that patient who has
complained to the Board of Podiatric Medicine about the licensee); id. § 2263 (West 1990) (declaring that any
intentional, unauthorized violation of professional confidence is unprofessional conduct); Judy E. Zelin,
Annotation, Physician's Tort Liability for Unauthorized Disclosure of Confidential Infonnation About Patient,
48 A.L.R. 4th 668, 680 (1986) (stating that some courts have acknowledged that if a physician reveals
confidential information about a patient, that patient may pursue a cause of action against the physician based
on an invasion of that patient's privacy); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 444.5 (West Supp. 1993)
(providing that persons who participate in a cardiac catheterization program must furnish statistical data and
patient information for effectively evaluating the program, and procedures will be established to protect the
confidentiality of the patient information); id. § 1250.9(a),(h) (West Supp. 1993) (noting that privilege procedures
will be put in place to assure the confidentiality of patient data gathered during any postsurgical care programs);
cf ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-714(B)(1) (1986) (providing that a tuberculosis control officer has the authority
to review medical data regarding the condition of tuberculosis patients, and such information will remain
confidential and will not reveal the identity of the patient to whom the data relates); CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92
(West Supp. 1993) (establishing that a psychotherapist is required to warn or protect others from a patient's
threatened volatile behavior where the patient has conveyed to the therapist a serious threat of bodily harm
against a person who can be readily identified); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-630(d) (West 1992) (providing
that information regarding a minor's treatment for alcohol or drug dependence cannot be divulged to that minor's
parents without the minor's consent); Johnson v. McMurray, 461 So. 2d 775, 778 (Ala. 1984) (noting that a
doctor and the doctor's patient share a confidential relationship); Tarasoff v. Regents of U. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d
425, 442, 551 P.2d 334, 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 27 (1976) (holding that the patient-psychotherapist privilege
must give way to situations where disclosure is necessary to prevent harm to others); lnabnit v. Berkson, 199
Cal. App. 3d 1230, 1239, 245 Cal. Rptr. 525, 531 (1988) (holding that when a plaintiff fails to assert the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, such non-action is equivalent to a waiver of the privilege); Colorado v. District
Court, 719 P.2d 722, 724 (Colo. 1986) (stating that the aim of the psychologist-patient privilege is to effectuate
a proper diagnosis and treatment of the patient by sheltering the patient from any shame that might result from
the psychologist's disclosure of their discussions during treatment); Tumlinson v. Texas, 663 S.W.2d 539, 542
(Tex Ct. App. 1983) (noting four exceptions to the patient-client privilege: (1) When the patient brings suit
against the professional; (2) when the patient waives the privilege; (3) when the intent of the suit is to
substantiate and collect on a claim for mental or emotional health services provided to the patient; or (4) when
the patient has spoken with a professional pursuant to a court ordered exam and has been informed that such
discussions will not be deemed confidential). But see Zelin, supra note 5, at 691-92 (explaining that some
jurisdictions do not adhere to the common law rule that the patient and the physician have a right to keep their
communications private, nor have they enacted statutes protecting such a privilege).
6. See CAL. INS. CODE § 791.02(q)(l)-(2) fVest 1993) (defining medical records as personal data which
concerns a person's physical or mental condition, medical history or treatment, and is obtained from a medical
professional, the individual, or the individual's wife, husband, mother, father, or legal guardian).
7. See CAL CIv. CODE § 3281 (Vest 1970) (providing that a person who is damaged from the unlawful
act of another may be compensated monetarily by the wrong doer); People v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 56 Cal.
App. 3d 593, 604, 128 Cal. Rptr. 697, 704 (1976) (noting that the law of compensatory damages is based on
the idea that an individual who is harmed should be justly and sufficiently compensated for his injuries).
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damages, 8  attorney's fees,9  and litigation expenses.10  Chapter 1004
provides that any corporation, organized primarily for the purpose of
maintaining medical information to be made available to the patient or to
a health care provider upon request, l" will be considered a health care
provider.' 2 Such a corporation is required to maintain the same level of
confidentiality, and will be subjected to the same punishment for a breach
of that confidentiality as any other health care provider. 3
Existing law allows a health care provider to disclose medical
information regarding a patient to the Insurance Commissioner, the
Division of Industrial Accidents, the Workers' Compensation Appeals
Board, and the Department of Insurance. 4  Chapter 1004 adds the
Commissioner of Corporations and the Department of Corporations to the
8. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1993) (stating that exemplary damages may be available
to a plaintiff where the defendant has breached his duty and is guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, in addition
to being liable for the actual damages, for the sake of setting an example of the defendant or to punish the
defendant).
9. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146(a)(I)-(4) (West 1990) (setting the limited amounts that an
attorney can collect in fees when representing a client seeking damages against a health care provider based upon
that person's alleged professional negligence); see also CAL. CIv. CODE § 1717(a) (Vest Supp. 1993) (providing
that where a contract allows for the reimbursement of attorney's fees and costs, the prevailing party is entitled
to recover them).
10, CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.35 (West 1982); see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1235.140 (West 1982) (including
the following as litigation expenses: (1) Reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in connection with trial
preparation, trial, and subsequent judicial proceedings; and (2) reasonable and necessary attorney's fees, appraisal
costs, and expert expenses incurred while protecting the defendant's interests in connection with the action); cf,
Anderson v. Strong Memorial Hosp., 531 N.Y.S.2d 735,735 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (recognizing that the plaintiff
stated a cause of action against the hospital for breach of physician-patient confidentiality, violating the
plaintiff's right not to have his identity disclosed, by permitting the newspaper photographer and reporter in the
infectious disease waiting room); 69 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 14, 14 (1986) (stating that a deceased's medical records
maintained at a private nursing home are not accessible, without the approval of the deceased's personal
representative, to non-related, private individuals who intend to investigate the deceased's cause of death); Bruce
A. McDonald, Ethical Problemnsfor Physicians Raised by AIDS and HI V Infection: Conflicting Legal Obligations
of Confidentiality and Disclosure, 22 U.C. DAViS L. REV. 557, 577 (1989) (noting that AIDS is a sensitive area
in the medical field, and recognizing that a hospital could face a civil suit if it breaches the physician-patient
confidentiality by revealing an AIDS patient's identity); In re Karlin, 112 B.R. 319, 322 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that a plastic surgeon did not breach his fiduciary duty to his patient by using his patient's pictures for
instructional purposes, as authorized by the patient, in an article regarding his practice).
11. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.06(a) (enacted by Chapter 1004) (stating that the request for medical data
must be made by the patient or health care provider).
12. Id.; see id. (providing that such a corporation will be considered a health care provider whether for
purposes of diagnosis, treatment, or other purposes). See generally Controversy Over Breast Implants Sparks
Registt', ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 24, 1992, at H3 (stating that the Medic Alert Foundation is an organization
which furnishes personal and medical information).
13. CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.06(b), (c) (enacted by Chapter 1004).
14. Id. § 56.30(k) (amended by Chapter 1004); see id. § 56.10(c)(I 1) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that a
health care provider may disclose medical information to an insurer, provided that the insurer has complied with
all of the necessary requirements for obtaining such information); cf. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-913 (Michie Supp.
1993) (prohibiting private review agents from revealing medical records during the course of any utilization
review activities, except to third parties with whom the agent is associated or acting on behalf of).
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list of organizations to which a health care provider can disclose such
information. 5
APW
Civil Procedure; contempt orders
Code of Civil Procedure § 1218 (amended)
AB 934 (Rainey); 1993 STAT. Ch. 746
Existing law provides that willful' failure to obey a support or other
court order is punishable as contempt of court.2 Chapter 746 states that a
15. CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.30(k) (amended by Chapter 1004).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 7(1) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that willfulness implies a purpose or
willingness to commit the act or to make the omission). Willfulness does not require any intent to violate the
law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage. Id.; see also People v. Johnson, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1369,
1374, 262 Cal. Rptr. 366, 369 (1989) (employing the California Penal Code § 7(1) definition of willfulness).
2. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1218(a) (amended by Chapter 746); see id. § 1209.5 (West Supp. 1993)
(stating that noncompliance with an order for care or support of a child is prima facie evidence of contempt of
court); id. § 1218(a) (amended by Chapter 746) (authorizing a fine up to $1000, imprisonment for up to five
days, or both, for a person found guilty of contempt); see also In re Marriage of Padilla, 18 Cal. App. 4th 708,
711, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 630, 631 (1993) (holding that deliberate concealment of a child is an equitable defense
to a claim for payment of child support accruing during the time of concealment); County of Santa Clara v.
Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 4th 1686, 1691-92, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 7, 10 (1992) (discussing federal due process
guarantees in contempt proceedings, and holding that if the contemnor is unable to afford an attorney, the court
is required to appoint counsel to represent him), review denied, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 1824 (1992); Iz re Marriage
of Regnery, 214 Cal. App. 3d 1367, 1371, 263 Cal. Rptr. 243, 244 (1989) (stating that, as a rule, the court may
consider the payor's earning capacity when determining child or spousal support only where the parent has
demonstrated a willful intention to avoid the obligation); In re Witherspoon, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1000, 1001-02,
209 Cal. Rptr. 67, 68 (1984) (stating that a civil contempt proceeding is criminal in nature because of the
penalties that may be imposed, and noting that the alleged contemnor is entitled to most constitutional rights
guaranteed to all criminally accused persons, and is entitled to a presumption of innocence until proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Marriage of Thompson, 96 Cal. App. 3d 621, 625, 158 Cal. Rptr. 160, 162
(1979) (upholding contempt proceedings and a transfer of personal property against a father who refused to
comply with the court's child support order); Lyons v. Municipal Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 829, 840, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 449, 453 (1977) (stating that it is well settled law that orders for child or spousal support may be enforced
by contempt proceedings); Huyser v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 499 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 1993) (holding that, before
determining that a father's non-payment of support was willful and therefore subject to a contempt order, the
District Court was required to consider an agreement between the mother and father which deferred payment
of child support to a later date). See generally ASSEMBLY COMMrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMtTrEE ANALYSIS
OF AB 934, at 2 (May 13, 1993) (stating the author's opinion that many courts are refraining from imprisoning
defendants because the jails are full, or because courts would prefer not to jail parents); Robert Monk, Comment,
The Indigent's Right to Court Appointed Counsel in Civil Contempt Proceedings For Nonpayment of Child
Support, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 326, 327 (1983) (arguing that the line between civil and criminal contempt
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person found in contempt of court for failure to obey a court order issued
pursuant to the Family Code or specified sections of the Welfare and
Institutions Code shall be disciplined by a direction to complete
community service instead of, or in addition to, a fine or imprisonment.3
Under Chapter 746, if the person is found in contempt three or more times,
the court is required to order: (1) Imprisonment and either a fine or
community service, or imprisonment and both such fine and community
service; and (2) contemnor's payment of an administrative fee for the
community service.4
SAK
proceedings in support cases is blurred, and that imprisonment in civil contempt proceedings is intended to be
remedial by coercing the defendant to do what the defendant has refused to do).
3. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1218(c) (amended by Chapter 746); see id (authorizing punishment for
failure to comply with a court order pursuant to the Family or Welfare and Institutions Code); id. § 1218(c)(1)
(amended by Chapter 746) (providing that upon the first finding of contempt, the court shall order the contemnor
to perform community service of up to 120 hours, instead of, or in addition to imprisonment of up to 120 hours,
for each count of contempt); id. § 1218(c)(2) (amended by Chapter 746) (providing that upon a second finding
of contempt the court shall order the contemnor to perform 120 hours of community service, in addition to
imprisonment for up to 120 hours or a fine up to $1,000, or both imprisonment and fine, for each count of
contempt); id. § 1218(c)(3)(A) (amended by Chapter 746) (providing that after three or more findings of
contempt, the court shall order the contemnor to serve up to 240 hours imprisonment, and to pay a fine of
$1,000 or perform community service of up to 240 hours, or both the fine and community service for each count
of contempt); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-6.1-16(h) (West Supp. 1992) (providing that a party found to
be delinquent in payment of child support, may be ordered to perform community service); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-32-12.1(1) (1993) (establishing a minimum of 10 hours of community service for failure to abide by an
order in a divorce decree regarding visitation, or for refusing to pay child support as ordered by the court);
Lesniewski v. Lesniewski, 595 So. 2d 361, 361 (La. 1992) (stating that the father was found in contempt for
non-payment of child support, and ordered to serve time in jail and perform community service); Columbus v,
Bickel, 601 N.E.2d 61, 64 (Ohio 1991) (stating that the defendant's jail term was suspended in lieu of three
years probation, which imposed special conditions including 120 hours of community service, payment of court
costs, and compliance with a child support order); State v. Nicastro, 383 S,E.2d 521, 529 (W. Va. 1989) (stating
that community service has become a common alternative to sentencing, greatly outdistancing legislative activity
explicitly authorizing its use). See generally ASSEBLY COMMIrTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF
AB 934, at 2, (May 13, 1993) (stating that supporters of the bill believe it is more productive for the parent to
perform community service than to sit in jail, and that the opposition believes that community service will create
an additional burden on probation personnel); Timothy J. Carter, Book Review, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
447 (1987) (reviewing Douglas Corry McDonald, Punishment Without Walls: Community Service Sentences in
New York City (1986)) (expressing doubt over the usefulness of community service as a substitute for jail,
contending that most of those sentenced to community service would not have actually been confined anyway);
Comment, Developments in the Law--Legal Responses to Domestic Violence 111, New State and Federal
Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1528, 1542-43 (1993) (arguing in favor of diversion
programs in spousal abuse cases because diversion avoids incarceration and allows abusers to keep their jobs
and maintain family relationships).
4. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1218(c)(3)(A) (amended by Chapter 746); see id. § 1218(c)(3)(B) (amended
by Chapter 746) (providing that, on the third finding of contempt, the court shall order the contemnor to pay
the administrative fee not to exceed the actual cost of the contemnor's administration and supervision, while
participating in the community service program); cf. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-32-12.1(6) (1993) (providing that
when a parent has refused to pay child support as ordered and is then ordered to perform community service
and participate in workshops, classes, or individual counseling, that parent shall be responsible for the expenses
of the workshops, classes, and individual counseling).
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Civil Procedure; court rules and procedures
Code of Civil Procedure § 575.6 (new); Government Code § 68070
(amended).
SB 425 (Lockyer); 1993 STAT. Ch. 925
Existing law requires the Judicial Council1 to adopt judicial
administration standards governing the appearance of counsel by telephone
in specified pretrial proceedings in civil cases.2 Chapter 925 provides that
each county superior court shall adopt a rule enabling the appearance of
counsel by telephone at trial setting conferences in civil cases.
Existing law authorizes every court to make local rules for its own
government which are not inconsistent with statutes or Judicial Council
rules.4 These rules can not impose a tax, charge, or penalty upon any legal
proceeding or any pleading allowed by law, nor may they give any
allowance to any officer for services.5 Chapter 925 requires the Judicial
Council to adopt rules and procedures to encourage uniformity of
requirements both throughout a court and statewide regarding: a) The form
of papers; b) limitations on the filing of papers; c) rules relating to law and
1. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (giving the Judicial Council its authority to adopt rules of practice and
procedure); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 575 (West 1979) (granting the Judicial Council the power to promulgate
rules governing pretrial conferences in civil cases).
2. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 575.5 (West Supp. 1993); see id. § 575.5(a) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that
the Judicial Council must adopt standards to govern the appearance of counsel by telephone at any pretrial, trial
setting, or arbitration determination conference); Independent Trust Corp. v. Stan Miller, Inc., 796 P.2d 483, 492
(Colo. 1990) (stating that pretrial conferences and orders are tools for simplifying issues with an eye toward
ultimately resolving lawsuits on the merits, not methods for avoiding trial); Misle Chevrolet Co. v. Kometscher,
408 N.W.2d 713, 716 (Neb. 1987) (stating that the purpose of a pretrial conference is to simplify the issues,
amend the pleadings, and avoid traps and surprises at trial).
3. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 575.6 (enacted by Chapter 925); see id. (stating that a local rule, adopted
pursuant to this section, may require the personal appearance of counsel at the trial setting conferences); Trust
Co. Bank v. Tingen-Millford Drapery Co., 119 F.R.D. 21, 23 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (stating that a telephone
conversation between defendant's attorney and plaintiff's attorney inquiring as to the date on which an answer
had to be filed constituted an appearance by implication). See generally SENATE RULES COMMIrEE, COPM61NME
ANALYSIS OF SB 425, at 2 (May 27, 1993) (stating that the purpose of this chapter is to enact several provisions
which will improve the administration of civil justice and enable civil litigators to utilize their time more
efficiently).
4. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68070(a) (amended by Chapter 925).
5. Id. § 68070(a)(l)-(2) (amended by Chapter 925); see Somlyo v. J. Lu-Rob Enter. Inc., 932 F.2d 1043,
1046 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that district court's local rules may not conflict with those rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court, Acts of Congress, or the Constitution); Jaroma v. Massey, 873 F.2d 17, 20 (lst Cir. 1989)
(stating that local district court rules may not conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Holloway v.
Lockhart, 813 F.2d 874, 880 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that district courts have the power to make local rules, but
the local rules may not be inconsistent with applicable provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
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motion; and d) requirements concerning documents either to be filed at, or
prior to trial.6
MJP
Civil Procedure; expert witness fees
Civil Code § 2034 (amended); Government Code § 68092.5
(amended).
AB 907 (Goldsmith); 1993 STAT. Ch. 678
Under existing law, a party deposing' any expert witness 2 is required
to pay that expert's reasonable and customary hourly or daily fee for the
time spent being deposed or consulted.3 Under existing law, if the
6. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68070(b) (amended by Chapter 925); see, e.g., U.S. DIST. CT. R. 5.1 (S.D. Ca.)
(discussing local rules on the documents submitted to the court); ORANGE COUNTY SuP. CT. R. 402 (discussing
the mandatory use of local court forms in civil trials); SACRAMENTO COUNTY SUP. CT. R. 30 (describing local
rules for civil law and motion departments); id. 31 (outlining local procedure for the filing of papers in law and
motion departments); SAN DIEGO COUNTY Sup. CT. R. Div. 11 4.1 (discussing the format and filing of papers
in a law and motion court); S.F. COUNTY Sup. CT. R. 3 (outlining local rules on law and motion departments);
id. R. 6 (outlining local rules on the presentation, filing, service and maintenance of court papers).
1. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 14 (West 1982); CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 17 (West 1982) (defining depose
as every mode of written statement under oath or affirmation).
2. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1878 (West 1983) (defining witness as a person whose declaration
under oath is received as evidence for any purpose, whether such declaration be made on oral examination, or
by deposition or affidavit); id. § 2034(a)(I)-(2) (amended by Chapter 678) (describing an expert witness as a
natural person who has been retained by a party for the purpose of forming and expressing an opinion in
anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial); CAL. EVID. CODE § 720 (West 1966) (discussing when a
person is qualified as an expert witness); id. § 801 (West 1966) (stating that the testimony of an expert witness
is limited to opinions relating to a subject sufficiently beyond common experience, and the expert's special
knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education are of a type that may be reasonably relied upon in forming
an opinion).
3. Id. § 2034(i)(2) (amended by Chapter 678); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68092.5(a) (amended by Chapter
678); see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2034(f)(2)(E) (amended by Chapter 678) (requiring the expert witness'
declaration to include a statement of the expert's fee for depositions and for consulting with the retaining
attorney); id. § 2034(i)(2) (amended by Chapter 678) (stating that a daily fee shall only be charged for a full
day of attendance at a deposition or where the expert was required by the deposing party to be available for a
full day where the witness had to forgo business on that day); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(c)(i) (requiring experts
to be paid a reasonable fee for the time spent responding to discovery); see also Rancho Bernardo Dev. Co. v.
Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 4th 358, 361-62, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 878, 879-80 (1992) (holding that an expert's
charges to an opposing party for depositions, which must be reasonable, may be greater than standard charges
for investigation and consultation); Lee v. Hyster Co., 509 N.E.2d 586, 590 (II1. App. 3d 1987) (holding that
the party seeking to take the deposition of an expert would be required to compensate the expert for any mileage
and per diem fees incurred as the result of the deposition); George v. Eaton, 789 S.W.2d 56, 61 (Mo. Ct. App.
1990) (holding that the party deposing an expert witness must pay a reasonable fee for the time spent by the
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deposing party believes that the expert's fee is unreasonable, the party can
move for an order setting the compensation for that expert.4 The order
must be accompanied by a declaration stating facts showing a good faith
attempt at an informal resolution of the fee dispute.5 Chapter 678 provides
that the court's determination of the reasonableness of the fee shall be
based on information which the expert or party designating the expert shall
provide.6 Chapter 678 provides that this information shall include: (1)
Proof of the customary fee actually charged and received by that expert for
similar services in past litigation; (2) the number of times the requested fee
has been charged and received by the expert; (3) the frequency of which
the requested fee has been charged and received by that expert in the last
two years; (4) ordinary and customary fees charged by other similar
experts for similar services; and (5) any other factors which the courts
deems necessary and appropriate to make its determination.7
MJP
expert in preparation for the deposition); Baird v. Larson, 801 P.2d 247, 249 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
that only opinions acquired and developed in anticipation of litigation are expert opinions for which the expert
is to be paid an expert fee by the party taking the deposition). See generally Review of Selected 1990 Legislation,
22 PAC. L.J. 441,441 (1990) (discussing 1990 amendments which limit the amount charged by an expert witness
to a deposing party). This amount may not exceed the rate the witness billed the hiring party for deposition
testimony. Id.
4. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2034(i)(4) (amended by Chapter 678); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68092.5(c)
(amended by Chapter 678).
5. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2034(i)(4) (amended by Chapter 678); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68092.5(c)
(amended by Chapter 678).
6. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2034(i)(4) (amended by Chapter 678); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68092.5(c)
(amended by Chapter 678).
7. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2034(i)(4) (amended by Chapter 678); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68092.5(c)
(amended by Chapter 678).
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Civil Procedure; motions by defendant-pleadings, judgments,
dismissals
Code of Civil Procedure § 438 (new); §§ 418.10, 425.11, 430.10,
435, 472a, 472c, 580, 581, 585, 586, 904.1, 917.1, 917.9, 1005,
1033.5 (amended).
AB 58 (Peace); 1993 STAT. Ch. 456
Existing law provides that a defendant may object to jurisdiction, prior
to pleading, by filing specified motions.' Chapter 456 adds as an
allowable motion, the motion to dismiss for delay in prosecution.2
1. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 418.10(a) (amended by Chapter 456); see id. (authorizing the motion to
quash for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the motion to dismiss on the ground of inconvenient forum); see also
Piper v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981) (holding that the first question a court must ask itself in considering
forum non conveniens is whether an alternate forum exists), reh'g denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982); Leet v. Union
Pac. R.R., 25 Cal. 2d 605, 609, 155 P.2d 42, 44 (1944) (holding that the rule of forum non conveniens is an
equitable doctrine whereby the court uses its discretionary power to decline to exercise the jurisdiction it has
over a transitory cause of action, when it determines that it would be more suitable to try the case elsewhere),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 866 (1945); Coulston v. Cooper, 245 Cal. App. 2d 866, 868, 54 Cal. Rptr. 302, 303
(1966) (stating that a defendant who claims that the service of summons does not bring him within the court's
jurisdiction may file a notice of motion to quash); cf. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b) (providing the defenses that may
be raised by motion including: (1) Lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) lack of personal jurisdiction; (3)
improper venue; (4) insufficiency of process; (5) insufficiency of service of process; (6) failure to state a claim;
and (7) failure to join a party. See generally 2 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Jurisdiction § 161 (3d
ed. 1985) (explaining the motion to quash service of summons); id. §§ 955-956 (3d ed. 1985) (explaining
California's former motion to dismiss); Alex W. Albright, In Personam Jurisdiction: A Confused and
Inappropriate Substitute For Forum Non Conveniens, 71 TEX. L. REv. 351, 396-97 (1992) (stating that a forum
non conveniens dismissal is not available if there is no alternate forum).
2. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 418.10(a)(3) (amended by Chapter 456); see id. § 583.210 (West Supp.
1993) (requiring that the defendant be served within three years of commencement of the action, and that the
summons be returned within 60 days after service on the defendant); id. § 583.250 (West Supp. 1993)
(mandating dismissal where defendant is not served within three years); id. § 533.310 (West Supp. 1993)
(requiring dismissal where the action is not brought to trial within five years of commencement of the action);
id. § 583.320 (Vest Supp. 1993) (stating that after a grant of new trial, the action shall be tried again within
three years); id. § 583.410 (West Supp. 1993) (allowing discretionary dismissal for delay in prosecution); id.
§ 583.420 (,Vest Supp. 1993) (stating the grounds for dismissal and the method used to compute the time before
dismissal is allowed or required); see also id. § 583.340 (Vest Supp. 1993) (stating the exceptions for delay
caused by impossibility, impracticability, or futility beyond the plaintiffs control); Monzon v. Schaefer
Ambulance Serv., Inc., 224 Cal. App. 3d 16, 28, 273 Cal. Rptr. 615, 621 (1990) (stating that the critical factor
in applying the exceptions is whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in prosecution); cf. FED. R. Civ.
P. 41 (b) (providing for involuntary dismissal when the plaintiff fails to prosecute the action); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-11-41(e) (Michie Supp. 1992) (allowing automatic dismissal after five years of inactivity). See generally
Note, Exercise of Discretion in Permitting Dismissals Without Prejudice Under Federal Rule 41(a), 54 COLUM.
L. REv. 616, 616-17 (1954) (discussing the plaintiff's right at common law to have the case dismissed at any
time, and the modern limits under the federal rules).
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Existing law allows a party to object to a complaint or cross-complaint
by demurrer3 or answer, on specified grounds. Chapter 456 adds as an
objection, a filing of demurrer or answer in actions brought by common
interest development associations,' for failure to file a certificate of
merit.'
With the enactment of Chapter 456, a plaintiff, defendant, or the court
on its own motion, may file a motion for judgment on the pleadings as
specified, to a pleading or a portion of a pleading.7
3. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 430.30 (,Vest 1973) (stating that when the ground for objection appears
on the face of the complaint, cross-complaint, or answer, the objection may be taken by demurrer); see, e.g.,
Whitcombe v. Yolo County, 73 Cal. App. 3d 698, 702, 141 Cal. Rptr. 189, 191 (1977) (stating that the purpose
of the demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleadings by raising questions of law); Porten v. U.S.F., 64 Cal.
App. 3d 825, 827, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 840-41 (1976) (stating that the demurrer is treated as admitting the
truthfulness of all factual allegations in the complaint). Contra FED. R. Civ. P. 7(c) (abolishing the demurrer);
id. 12(b)(6) (allowing the defendant to file a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim).
4. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 430.10 (West Supp. 1993); see id. (stating such grounds as lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, plaintiff's lack of capacity, defect or misjoinder of parties, failure to state a cause of action
in the pleading, and uncertainty of pleading); see also Bowden v. Robinson, 67 Cal. App. 3d 705, 710, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 871, 875 (1977) (discussing the fact that an objection to a complaint for failure to state a cause of action
may be raised by general demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings, or motion for summary judgment);
Friendly Village Community Ass'n, Inc. v. Silva and Hill Constr. Co., 31 Cal. App. 3d 220, 223, 107 Cal. Rptr.
123, 125 (1973) (holding that the question of capacity cannot be raised by demurrer); Mull v. Hunter, 266 Cal.
App. 2d 657, 660, 72 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204 (1968) (holding that the general demurrer must be sustained if the
complaint fails to state a cause of action, but the plaintiff must be given leave to amend if the complaint is
subject to amendment); Buss v. Martin, 241 Cal. App. 2d 123, 133, 50 Cal. Rptr. 206, 213 (1966) (holding that
the special demurrer to attack subject matter jurisdiction is treated the same as a general demurrer for failure
to state a cause of action); People v. Taliaferro, 149 Cal. App. 2d 822, 824-25, 309 P.2d 48, 49 (1957) (holding
that a special demurrer alleging uncertainty does not attack a failure to incorporate sufficient facts, but rather
is directed at the uncertainty of the facts stated); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (setting forth the procedure and types
of objections that may be made by motion). See generally 5 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Pleading
§§ 922-23 (3d. ed. 1985) (discussing the objection for nonjoinder and misjoinder of parties under CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 430.10(d)).
5. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1351(c)(1)-(4) (West Supp. 1993) (defining common interest development as
a community apartment project, a condominium project, a planned development, or a stock cooperative), see also
id. § 1351(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining association as either a nonprofit corporation or unincorporated
association which is created to manage a common interest development).
6. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 430.10(i) (amended by Chapter 456); see id. § 411.36 (West Supp. 1993)
(stating the procedure for bringing an action against a common interest development association, including the
filing of a certificate of merit). See generally Review of Selected 1992 California Legislation, 24 PAC. L.J. 591,
670-71 (1993) (discussing the requirement that a certificate of merit be filed in actions brought under California
Code of Civil Procedure §§ 411.35-.36).
7. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 438(c)(2)(A)-(B) (enacted by Chapter 456); see id. (stating that the motion
may be made to the complaint, cross-complaint, any cause of action stated in the complaint, to the entire answer,
or to one or more of the defenses set forth in the answer); id. § 438(c)(1)(A) (enacted by Chapter 456)
(providing that a plaintiff may move for judgment on the pleadings when the complaint states facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action, and defendant's answer does not state facts constituting a defense); id. §
438(c)(l)(B)(i)-(ii) (enacted by Chapter 456) (providing that a defendant may move for judgment on the
pleadings when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, or where the complaint does not state facts
constituting a cause of action); id. § 438(b)(2),(c)(3) (enacted by Chapter 456) (stating that the court may, on
its own motion, grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff when the plaintiff's
Selected 1993 Legislation
Civil Procedure
Existing law allows an appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer
without leave to amend where the court has abused its discretion. 8 Chapter
456 specifies the orders that are open to appeal, where an amended
pleading is filed after the court's order.9
Existing law allows dismissal in certain enumerated situations."
Chapter 456 expands the instances in which an action may be dismissed
to include occasions where objections are made to jurisdiction using the
motion to quash or the motion to dismiss."
Existing law requires a party to enter a separate statement setting forth
the amount of damages sought. 2 Chapter 456 integrates existing law
complaint states facts constituting a cause of action, but the defendant's answer does not state facts constituting
a defense; and that the motion may also be granted for a defendant where the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, or the complaint fails to state a cause of action against the defendant); id. § 438(d)-(g) (enacted by
Chapter 456) (stating that the grounds for the motion shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading, that
the motion for judgment on the pleadings may not be made after a pretrial conference order has been entered,
or within 30 days of the initial trial date, whichever is later, unless the court permits, that the motion for
judgment on the pleadings may only be made by a plaintiff after the defendant has filed an answer, or by a
defendant where the defendant has already filed an answer and the time for the defendant to demur to the
complaint has expired, and that the motion can be made even if it rests on the same grounds as a demurrer
which was previously overruled, provided there has been a material change in applicable case law or statute);
see id. § 438(h)(l)-(2) (enacted by Chapter 456) (providing that the motion for judgment on the pleadings may
be granted with or without leave to amend, and when leave to amend is granted, 30 days shall be given to do
so); cf. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(c); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-1 1-12(c) (Michie 1982) (authorizing the use of the motion
for judgment on the pleadings).
S. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 472c(a) (amended by Chapter 456); see FED. R. CIv. P. 15(a) (allowing one
amendment as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is filed, and then by leave of court); Sirott v. Latts,
6 Cal. App. 4th 923, 930, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 206, 210 (1992) (holding that it is an abuse of discretion to sustain
a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment);
Mendoza v. Tulare County, 128 Cal. App. 3d 403, 420, 180 Cal. Rptr. 347, 357-58 (1982) (holding that it was
an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend where the plaintiffs could have refiled their
petition as a habeas corpus, or where the court could have treated the complaint as such a petition).
9. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 472c(b) (amended by Chapter 456); see id. (stating that an appeal is allowed
from an order sustaining: (1) A demurrer to a cause of action, where the order was not as to the entire
complaint; (2) a demurrer to an affirmative defense, where the order was not as to the entire answer; or (3) a
motion to strike a portion of a pleading, where the order did not strike the entire pleading).
10. Id. § 581(b)(1)-(5) (amended by Chapter 456); see id. (stating that an action may be dismissed by:
(1) A request by the plaintiff, with or without prejudice; (2) any party where all parties consent; (3) the court
without prejudice, where the parties fail to appear at trial; (4) the request of one of the parties, where the other
party failed to appear at trial; and (5) dismissal for delay in prosecution); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (providing for
dismissal of actions).
11. CAL. ClV. PROC. CODE § 581(h) (amended by Chapter 456); id. § 581(m) (amended by Chapter 456)
(providing that the provisions of this section shall not be deemed an exclusive enumeration of the court's power
to dismiss an action or complaint); see id. § 418.10 (amended by Chapter 456) (allowing objections using the
motion to quash or motion to dismiss).
12. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.11 (a),(b) (amended by Chapter 456); see id. (providing that when a
complaint or cross-complaint is filed to recover damages for personal injury or wrongful death, the party against
whom the action is brought may at any time request a statement of the nature and amount of damages sought).
If no request is made, the plaintiff shall serve the statement on the defendant before a default judgment may be
entered, or if an answer is filed, at least 60 days prior to the date set for trial. Id.
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regarding the statement of damages sought with the law regarding default
judgments by providing that the judgment awarded a plaintiff upon a
defendant's default may not exceed the amount requested in the complaint
or statement of damages.13
Existing law authorizes a direct appeal from specified judgments.
14
Chapter 456 allows a direct appeal from an interlocutory judgment or an
order to pay monetary sanctions in excess of five thousand dollars. a5
Review of sanctions imposed for less than five thousand dollars must
either wait until final judgment is entered, or obtain permission from the
court of appeal upon petition for an extraordinary writ.
16
Existing law provides that extraordinary costs are not automatically
subject to a stay of enforcement.17 Chapter 456 requires that a bond or
undertaking be filed in order to stay enforcement of specified orders.1"
13. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 585(a) (amended by Chapter 456); see id. (providing that a plaintiff upon
proof of service of summons may request a default judgment, and the court shall enter a judgment for the
principal amount demanded in the complaint or the statement of damages required by California Code of Civil
Procedure Code § 425.11); cf. FED. R. CIv. P. 54(c) (providing that a judgment by default shall not be different
in kind or form, or exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment).
14. Id. § 904.1(a)(1)-(10) (amended by Chapter 456); see id. (allowing an appeal from a superior court
from (1) a judgment, except as otherwise provided; (2) an order made after a judgment made appealable by
paragraph one; (3) an order granting a motion to quash or a motion to stay or dismiss for forum non conveniens;
(4) an order granting a new trial or denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; (5) an order
discharging or refusing to discharge an attachment or granting a right to attach order, (6) an order granting or
dissolving an injunction, or refusing to grant or dissolve an injunction; (7) an order appointing a receiver; (8)
an interlocutory judgment, order, or decree made or entered in an action to redeem real property; (9) an
interlocutory judgment in an action for partition; (10) an order made appealable by the Probate Code or the
Family Code).
15. Id. § 904.1(11),(12) (amended by Chapter 456).
16. Id. § 904.1(b) (amended by Chapter 456); see Kerr v. United States Dist. Ct., 426 U.S. 394, 402-03
(1975) (discussing the difficulty in obtaining writ review in the federal system, and the need to discourage
piecemeal litigation); In re Robert S., 9 Cal. App. 4th 1417, 1420, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 489,491 (1992) (stating that
an order allowing a writ reflects a determination that the petitioner has no adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law): Omaha Indem. Co. v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1266, 1272,258 Cal. Rptr. 66, 69 (1989)
(explaining that relief by the extraordinary writ is so hard to obtain because of court congestion and the fear of
gridlock, and the fact that as the case proceeds, the importance of the issue may diminish); see also id. (stating
that courts will not use their scarce resources to second guess every ruling and order, especially when it would
not save time or aid in the resolution of the case); cf. Sup. CT. R. 20 (1989) (citing the procedure on petition
for an extraordinary writ). See generally JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 597 (2d ed. 1985)
(discussing the use of extraordinary writs of mandamus and prohibition); 8 B.E. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE, Eiytraordinan, Writs (3d ed. 1985); Robert S. Berger, The Mandamus Power of the United States
Court of Appeals, 31 BUFF. L. REV. 37 (1982) (discussing the federal court's use of extraordinary writs in
appellate review).
17. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 917.1(a) (amended by Chapter 456).
18. Id. § 917.1(a)(l)-(3) (amended by Chapter 456); see id. (requiring an undertaking to stay the
enforcement for a judgment or order: (1) for money; (2) for costs awarded for failure of a party to accept a fair
compromise offer which otherwise would not have been awarded as costs; and (3) costs awarded pursuant to
a judgment in a trial de novo that is less favorable than the arbitration award, which otherwise would not have
been awarded as costs); see also Bank of San Pedro v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th 797, 799, 838 P.2d 218, 219,
Selected 1993 Legislation
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Chapter 456 grants discretion to the courts to stay an award of costs in all
other cases upon the filing of a sufficient bond.' 9
Existing law specifies that attorney's fees are allowable as costs when
provided for by contract or statute.20 Chapter 456 provides that attorney's
fees may also be awarded when authorized by law.21
SAK
Civil Procedure; publication of jurors' personal information
Code of Civil Procedure §§ 206, 237 (amended).
AB 1915 (Boland); 1993 STAT. Ch. 632
Existing law allows the names of qualified jurors' for the superior
court to be made publicly available, upon request, unless the court
12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696, 697 (1992) (holding that the enforcement of an award of expert witness fees is not
automatically stayed while the judgment is appealed). The appellant must post an appeal bond or other sufficient
undertaking to obtain a stay pending appeal. Id.; SENATE COMMITrEE ON JUDICIARY, CommITrrEE ANALYSIS OF
AB 58, at 4 (Aug. 17, 1993) (stating that the requirement in AB 58 for underwriting or bond for a stay of cost
awards pending appeal would codify the Supreme Court's decision in Bank of San Pedro v. Superior Court).
19. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 917.9 (amended by Chapter 456).
20. Id. § 1033.5(a)(10)(A)-(B) (amended by Chapter 456); see id. § 1021 (\Vest Supp. 1993) (stating that
except as provided by statute, attorney's fees are left to the express or implied agreement of the parties, but the
parties are entitled to their costs as provided under the Civil Code); id. § 1021.1 (\Vest Supp. 1993) (allowing
the award of attorney's fees, as an element of costs, in certain counties for failure to accept a settlement offer).
See generally Kent S. Scheidegger, Comment, Attorney's Fees and Civil Code Section 1717, 13 PAC. L.J. 233,
239-40 (1982) (discussing the scope of California Civil Code § 1717 as interpreted by the California courts).
21. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1033.5(a)(10)(C) (amended by Chapter 456); see Brandt v. Superior Court,
37 Cal. 3d 813, 817, 693 P.2d 796, 798, 210 Cal. Rptr. 211, 213 (1985) (holding that when an insurer's tortious
conduct reasonably compels the insured to retain an attorney to collect under the policy, the insured is liable for
costs incurred); Gray v. Don Miller & Assoc., 35 Cal. 3d 498, 505, 674 P.2d 253, 257, 198 Cal. Rptr. 551, 555
(1984) (discussing the award of attorney fees under the "tort of another" theory which holds that when a person
is required to obtain an attorney because of the defendant's tortious conduct, the person may recover attorney
fees). See generally Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 34, 569 P.2d 1303, 1306, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 318 (1977)
(setting forth three nonstatutory situations where attorney's fees may be recovered: (1) The common fund theory;
(2) the substantial benefit theory; and (3) the private attorney general theory); Rider v. County of San Diego,
I1 Cal. App. 4th 1410, 1422-23, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885, 893 (1992) (discussing the award of attorney's fees
through the court's equity power under the common fund theory), review denied, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 1792 (1993);
see also CALIFORNIA ATrORNEY'S FEES AWARD PRACTICE, §§ 3.1-3.17 (Cal. Continuing Ed. Bar 1982 and
Supp. 1992) (discussing the award of attorney's fees under equitable theories and California Code of Civil
Procedure § 1021.5).
1. See CAL. CIr. PROC. CODE § 1940) (Vest Supp. 1993) (defining "qualified juror" as a person who
meets the statutory qualifications for jury service).
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determines that there is a compelling governmental interest requiring that
juror information be kept confidential or its use limited.2 Existing law
permits any person to petition the court for access to these records.3 Upon
such a petition, these records shall be made available, absent a finding of
continued government interest.
4
Chapter 632 provides that a judge shall inform jurors, before they are
discharged from a criminal case, of their right to request that personal juror
2. Id. § 237(a) (amended by Chapter 632); see id. § 206(f) (amended by Chapter 632) (allowing a
defendant or defendant's counsel to request personal information about jurors, including names, addresses, and
telephone numbers, in order to communicate with jurors for the purpose of developing issues on appeal); id. §
237(b) (amended by Chapter 632) (recognizing the government's interest in protecting jurors from physical harm
or threats of physical harm); id. § 237(d) (amended by Chapter 632) (allowing the court to limit access to the
juror identification records to the defendant and the defendant's counsel or investigator, for the purpose of
developing issues on appeal or for any lawful purpose); CAL. PENAL CODE § 95.1 (Vest Supp. 1993)
(recognizing it to be a public offense to threaten a juror with respect to criminal proceedings in which a verdict
has been rendered); In re Globe Newspaper Co. v. Hurley, 920 F.2d 88, 98 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that juror
names and addresses must be made public unless there are special circumstances, such as juror safety, to justify
nondisclosure). The desire of the jurors and the beliefs of the judge that the names and addresses of the jurors
should be confidential, are not sufficient justifications to withhold their identities. Id.; see also Karen Nikos,
Jurors' Identities in Beating Case to be Kept Secret, PHOENIX GAzETTE, Feb. 12, 1993, at A6 (stating that the
judge in the Reginald Denny beating case ruled that the identities of the jurors would be kept secret because of
the publicity involved, and the potential for violence). The article also stated that some legal experts feel that
extraordinary steps used to keep jurors' identities anonymous could signify an alarming trend toward a less
accountable judicial system. Id.; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1867(d) (1968) (allowing parties to use any relevant records and
papers used by the jury commissioner or clerk to support a motion challenging the selection of the jury); id. §
1867(f) (1968) (stating that the contents of records or papers used by the jury commissioner or clerk in
connection with the jury selection process shall not be disclosed except to the parties during the preparation and
pendency of a motion on the jury selection process); Gannett Co. v. State, 571 A.2d 735, 742 (Del. 1989)
(holding that the trial court's order to keep the names of jurors, who were to serve in a highly publicized murder
trial, unannounced, was within the trial court's judicial power), later proceeding, State v. Pennell, 583 A.2d 1348
(Del. Super. Ct. 1990). cert. denied, Gannett Co. v. Delaware, 495 U.S. 918 (1990). See generally Jury Pool
Small for Beating Trial, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 5, 1993, at A8 (discussing the judge's ruling that the names of the
jurors in the Rodney King civil rights case be kept confidential to prevent harassment of the jurors); Joyce Price,
Two Jurors Threatened After Paper Prints Names, WASH. TIMES, May 2, 1992, at A10 (reporting that two jurors
from the Rodney King trial had received threatening phone calls after their names and cities of residence had
appeared in local papers, and that these papers had received many phone calls in protest of their printing the
juror information).
3. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 237(c) (amended by Chapter 632).
4. Id.; see Baltimore Sun v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that the First Amendment
right of access to judicial records can be denied only by proof of a compelling government interest and proof
that the denial is narrowly tailored to serve that interest); In re Baltimore Sun, 841 F.2d 74, 75-76 (4th Cir.
1988) (holding that once the jury had been chosen, newspapers were entitled to the names and addresses of
jurors and alternates sitting in a criminal case); see also Paul Langer, US Appeals Court to Decide
Confidentiality of Jurors' Names, BOSTON GLOBE, June 3, 1990, Metro, at 82 (discussing the dispute between
keeping the names of jurors confidential and making them available for public viewing); Elizabeth Neuffer,
Jurors' Names Not Secret, the U.S. Appeals Court Rules, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 29, 1990, Metro, at 37
(discussing the ruling that a federal judge cannot withhold ajury list from the public after a trial unless the judge
determines that the juror's lives are at risk).
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identification information be sealed.5 Chapter 632 requires the court to
give notice6 to affected jurors of any petition for access to their
confidential juror information so that the juror can appear at the hearing
to protest the granting of the petition.7
MJP
Civil Procedure; summary judgment
Code of Civil Procedure § 437c (amended).
AB 498 (Goldsmith); 1993 STAT. Ch. 276
5. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 206(a) (amended by Chapter 632); see id. § 237(b) (specifying that juror
information can be sealed by request of a juror, motion of counsel, or on the court's own motion); ef. United
States v. Doherty, 675 F.Supp. 719, 723 (D. Mass. 1987) (holding that under the First Amendment, the public
has a general right, at some reasonable time after a verdict is delivered, to the names and addresses of the
jurors), post-conviction proceeding, United States v. Doherty, 675 F.Supp. 726 (D. Mass 1987). The court
balanced the First Amendment right of the press to access the names and addresses of jurors, against the jurors'
privacy interests by allowing the names and addresses of the jurors to be released seven days after the verdict
had been returned in the trial. Id. at 724-25.
6. See CAL. Ctv. PROC. CODE § 237(c) (amended by Chapter 632) (requiring notice to be given 10 days
prior to the date of the hearing, delivered by personal service or first class mail, and addressed to the last known
address of the former juror as shown in the court records).
7. Id.; see id. (stating that a former juror who wishes to appear at the hearing may request the court to
close the hearing in order to protect the former juror's anonymity); see also SENATE RULES COMMIrIrIEI3,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1915, at 2-3 (July 16, 1993) (stating that the intent of this chapter is to protect
jurors from public harassment after unpopular verdicts, such as the inconvenience suffered by the jurors after
the Rodney King trial in the California state court). See generally Marc 0. Litt, "Ctizen-Soldiers" or
Anonymous Justice: Reconciling the Sixth Amendment Right of the Accused, the First Amendment Right of the
Media and the Privacy Right of Jurors, 25 COLUm. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 371 (1992) (discussing the conflict
between the First Amendment rights of the media to gain access to juror identification information and the
privacy interests of the jurors); Verdicts Returned in LA. Beating, Profiles of 12 Jurors: All White, Most Viewed
Police as Having a "Tough" Job, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 30, 1992, at A13 (providing biographical
sketches and law enforcement views, along with names and occupations, of the jurors in the California state
Rodney King trial); The 12 Men and Women Who Make Up the Jury, L.A. DAILY NEWs, Apr. 30, 1992, at A12
(listing the names and short biographies of each juror in the Rodney King trial); A Glimpse of Jurors in King
Beating Case, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Apr. 30, 1992, at A10 (outlining juror profiles of jurors in the
California state Rodney King trial); Dawn Vebb--r, Prosecution Strategy, Criticize No Testimony by Kits as
Major Flaw, L.A. DAILY NEws, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al (discussing trial tactics used in the Rodney King trial, and
listing juror profiles).
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Existing law allows any party to move for summary judgment in an
action when it is contended that there is no merit or defense to the action.1
Existing law states that a cause of action has no merit if one or more of
the elements of the cause of action, even if separately pleaded cannot be
separately established, or a defendant establishes an affirmative defense to
the cause of action.2 Existing law provides that once the moving party has
met the burden of proof,3 the burden shifts to the non-moving party to
show that a triable issue of material fact exists.4 Under Chapter 276, the
non-moving party may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its
pleading to meet the burden of proof.5 Chapter 276 requires the non-
1. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(a) (amended by Chapter 276); see id. § 437c(b) (amended by Chapter
276) (providing that the papers submitted by a party may include affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers
to interrogatories, and depositions); id. § 437c(c) (amended by Chapter 276) (stating that a court shall grant the
motion if all papers submitted raise no triable issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to relief as
a matter of law); Mann v. Cracchiolo, 38 Cal. 3d 18, 35, 694 P.2d 1134, 1143, 210 Cal. Rptr. 762, 771 (1985)
(explaining that summary judgment is a drastic measure and should be used with caution); Chern v. Bank of
America, 15 Cal. 3d 866, 873, 544 P.2d 1310, 1314, 127 Cal. Rptr. 110, 114 (1976) (stating that the purpose
of summary judgment is to penetrate the pleadings and determine whether a triable issue of material fact exists);
cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (setting forth the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure for a summary judgment motion); NEV.
R. Civ. P. 56 (1992) (adopting the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure for a summary judgment motion); Matsush".ta
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (holding that in order to survive the
petitioner's motion for summary judgment the respondents must show more than a conspiracy in violation of
the antitrust laws; they must show an injury to them resulting from the illegal conduct); Dredge Corp. v. Husite
Co., 369 P.2d 676, 686 (Nev. 1962), (concluding that summary judgment was proper because the record was
devoid of any showing that Dredge Corporation was the owner of valid mining claims on the property), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962) . See generally Curtis E.A. Karnow, Archeology of Error: Tracing California's
Summary Judgment Rule, 24 PAC. LJ. 1845, 1858-69 (1993) (outlining the statutory background of the summary
judgment rule in California); Review of Selected 1992 California Legislation, 24 PAC. L.J. 591, 683-85 (1993)
(discussing the 1992 amendments to the California Code of Civil Procedure § 437c); Ernst J. Zack, California
Summary Judgment: The Need For Legislative Reform, 59 CAL. L. REV. 439, 440-53, 474-83 (1971) (providing
a comprehensive discussion of California Code of Civil Procedure § 437c and advocating the need for reform).
2. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 437c(n) (amended by Chapter 276); see Cox v. State, 3 Cal. App. 3d. 301,
310, 82 Cal. Rptr. 896, 901 (1970) (proclaiming that it must clearly appear that an action is without merit before
a defendant's motion for summary judgment can be granted).
3. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 437c(o)(1) (amended by Chapter 276) (stating that a plaintiff or cross-
complainant has met the burden of proof by showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party
has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to relief); id. § 437c(o)(2) (amended by
Chapter 276) (stating that a defendant or cross-defendant has met the burden of proof in showing that the cause
of action has no merit if that party has shown that one or more of the elements of the cause of action can not
be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action).
4. Id. § 437c(o)(1),(2) (amended by Chapter 276); see Buehler v. Oregon-Washington Plywood Corp.,
17 Cal. 3d 520, 526, 551 P.2d 1226, 1229-30, 131 Cal. Rptr. 394, 397-98 (1976) (explaining that summary
judgment may only be granted if no issue of material fact exists and any doubts about whether summary
judgment is proper should be resolved against the moving party where affidavits have been submitted); Walsh
v. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 1 Cal. App. 3d 578, 583, 81 Cal. Rptr. 804, 807 (1969) (stating that
whether a triable issue of fact exists is determined from the affidavits of the parties).
5. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(o)(1),(2) (amended by Chapter 276); see Corelison v. Kombluth, 15
Cal. 3d 590, 595-96, 542 P.2d 981, 985, 125 Cal. Rptr. 557, 561 (1975) (following Coyne v. Krempels); Coyne
v. Krempels, 36 Cal. 2d 257, 263, 223 P.2d 244, 247, (1950) (holding that allegations or denials of a verified
complaint are not a substitute for controverting affidavits); cf. FEo. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (stating that a non-moving
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moving party to set forth specific facts showing that a triable issue of
material fact exists.
6
Existing law allows a party to move for summary adjudication as to
one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative
defenses, one or more claims for damages,7 or one or more issues of
duty.8 Chapter 276 states that a motion for summary adjudication shall be
granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative
defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.9 When a motion for
party may not rely on the allegations or denials contained in its pleadings); see generally John A. Bauman,
California Summary Judgment: A Search for a Standard, 10 UCLA L. Ray. 347, 347-51 (1963) (providing a
detailed discussion of Coyne v. Krempels and its relationship to other decisions involving California Code of
Civil Procedure § 437c).
6. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(o)(1)-(2) (amended by Chapter 276); see FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e)
(providing that the non-moving party must set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of a material fact
exists); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986) (interpreting FED. R. Civ. P. 56 and holding that
the moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, however,
this burden may be met without the support of affidavits by pointing out to the court that the opposing party
has no evidence to support an essential element of the claim); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986) (stating that the substantive law will identify issues that are material and only those disputes over
facts that might affect the outcome may properly preclude the entry of summary judgment); see also William
J. Dowling, 26 U.S.F. L. REv. 493, 499-503 (1991) (discussing the differences between the California and
Federal rules for a summary judgment *motion); Melissa L. Nelken, One Step Fonvard, Two Steps Back:
Summary Judgment After Celotex, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 62-85 (1988) (providing a descriptive analysis of the
majority and dissenting opinions in Celotex and the effect the decision had on federal summary judgment
proceedings); Michael Paul Thomas, State Courts ShouldAdopt Federal Sunmaty Judgment, L.A. DALY J., July
17, 1992, at 7 (asserting that the difference between the California and Federal rules for summary judgment is
procedural and not substantive). But see Biljac Assoc. v. First Interstate Bank, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1410, 1421-22,
267 Cal. Rptr. 819, 825 (1990) (refusing to apply the rule in Celotex because it is not binding on state courts,
and under California Code of Civil Procedure § 437c the moving party generally must negate the issues which
the non-moving party will have the burden of proving at trial, even where the moving party enjoys a
presumption affecting the burden of proof at trial).
7. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that a claim for exemplary damages
exists if: (1) In an action for breach of an obligation other than contract it is proven by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice; or (2) in an action against an
employer where the employer had advance knowledge of the employee's unfitness and employed him with a
conscious disregard for the safety of others).
8. CAL. Ctv. PROC. CODE § 437c(f)(1) (amended by Chapter 276); see Danieley v. Goldmine Ski Assoc.,
218 Cal. App. 3d 111, 126-28, 266 Cal. Rptr. 749, 758-60 (1990) (ruling that summary judgment was proper
because an affidavit stating that a woman ran into a tree thirty feet off the ski run was insufficient to support
the central issue of whether the ski resort had a duty to remove the tree); Southland Corp. v. Superior Court,
203 Cal. App. 3d 656, 664-68, 250 Cal. Rptr. 57, 61-63 (1988) (finding a triable issue of fact in whether a
proprietor owed a duty to an invitee who was attacked by third parties in the lot adjacent to his liquor store
because there was evidence that the owner's lease allowed non-exclusive use of the adjacent parking lot, the
owner's parking lot was inadequate, and customers regularly used that lot); Northrop Corp. v. Stinson Sales
Corp., 151 Cal. App. 3d 653, 657-58, 199 Cal. Rptr. 16, 18-19 (1984) (stating that settlement with one or more
tortfeasors in good faith is sufficient to warrant a summary judgment dismissing that tortfeasor from the action
because settlement of a claim in good faith is a complete defense).
9. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(f)(1) (amended by Chapter 276); see Andalon v. Superior Court, 162
Cal. App. 3d 600, 605, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899, 901 (1984) (stating that if material facts are dispositive of one of
the claims the prevailing party is entitled to partial summary judgment). If material facts are dispositive of
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summary adjudication is granted, existing law declares that those causes
of action, affirmative defenses, claims for damages, or issues of duty are
established and allows the action to continue as to the remaining causes,
defenses, claims, or issues.10 Chapter 276 states that the fact that
summary adjudication has been granted as to one or more causes of action,
affirmative defenses, claims for damages, or issues of duty within the
action shall not operate to bar any cause, defense, claim, or issue as to
which summary adjudication was either not sought, or was denied.1"
Chapter 276 forbids a party, witness, or the court from commenting on the
grant or denial of a motion for summary adjudication when an objection
is made to the motion for summary adjudication.
2
JCA
Civil Procedure; trespass exemption to service of process; delivery of
order to judgment debtor
Code of Civil Procedure § 708.110 (amended); Penal Code § 602
(amended).
AB 504 (Quackenbush); 1993 STAT. Ch. 793
Under existing law, an individual is guilty of a misdemeanor if that
individual commits a trespass by driving a vehicle' upon the property of
something else, however, such as an element of a cause of action or defense, the prevailing party is only entitled
to a declaration that there is no material issue as to that element of the cause of action or defense. Id.
10. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(m)(1) (amended by Chapter 276); see Niederer v. Ferreira, 150 Cal.
App. 3d 219, 222-23, 197 Cal. Rptr. 685, 687-88 (1983) (declaring that § 437c allows the entry of partial
summary judgment before the remaining issues are tried); Conway v. Bughouse, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 3d 194,202,
164 Cal. Rptr. 585, 590 (1980) (stating that the purpose of partial summary judgment is to dispose of one or
more issues before trial, so the parties may concentrate on the issues that remain).
11. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(m)(2) (amended by Chapter 276); see Rich v. Seigel, 7 Cal. App. 3d
465, 467-70, 86 Cal. Rptr. 665, 665-67 (1970) (explaining that partial summary judgment is not in fact a
judgment; it is an order directing subsequent entry of judgment after the remaining issues have been
adjudicated).
12. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(m)(3) (amended by Chapter 276).
I. See CAL VEH. CODE § 670 (West 1987) (defining vehicle).
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another without the owner's consent.2 Chapter 793 exempts any person
making a lawful service of process3 from this provision.4
Existing law obligates a judgment creditor to personally serve a copy
of an order that requires the presence of a judgment debtor before a court
to furnish information that will facilitate the enforcement of the money
judgment.' Chapter 793 limits the creditor's delivery options by restricting
the available mode to personal delivery.
AK
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 602(m) (amended by Chapter 793).
3. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 17(6) (West 1982) (defining process); id. § 414.10 (West 1973)
(authorizing anyone over the age of 18 and not a party to the action to serve a summons); see also CAL. BUS,
& PROF. CODE § 22350 (West Supp. 1993) (enumerating criteria for qualification as a registered process server);
CAL. EVID. CODE § 647 (West Supp. 1993) (providing that return of process by a registered server establishes
a presumption, affecting the burden of producing evidence, of the facts stated in the return).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 602(m) (amended by Chapter 793); see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 415.10 (West
Supp. 1993) (authorizing personal delivery of a summons and complaint); Golden v. Dungan, 20 Cal. App. 3d
295, 310, 97 Cal. Rptr. 577, 587 (1971) (recognizing that under ordinary circumstances entry upon premises to
serve legal process cannot be deemed trespass); WILLIAM B. PEAVEY, JR., A GUIDE TO SERVICE OF PROCESS
IN CALIFORNIA 19 (1973) (classifying a process server as a public entrant allowed to come onto private property
during the course of the work day); cf. Farm Credit Bank v. Obrigewitch, 462 N.W.2d 113, 114 (N.D. 1990)
(recounting an incident in which a defendant barricaded herself in her residence and threatened prosecution for
criminal trespass if a process server attempted entry). But see SENATE COMMITI'EE ON JUDICIARY, COMMIrEE
ANALYSIS OF AB 504, at 4 (June 22, 1993) (quoting opponents of the new law who find it to be violative of
"privacy, security, and property rights of individuals"). See generally ROBERT 1. WEIL & IRA A. BROWN,
CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL §§ 4:31-4:147.6a (1992) (outlining service of
summons procedure); 3 B.E. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Process §§ 710-820 (3rd ed. 1985) (setting forth
explanations of service of process law).
5. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 708.110(d) (amended by Chapter 793); see 2 DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICE
IN CALIFORNIA §§ 8.2, 8.7 (Cal. Continuing Educ. Bar, 1987 & Supp. 1993) (elaborating on the procedure by
which a judgment creditor may serve an order upon a debtor); Alice M. Wright, Enforcement ofJudgnents, ill
4 CALIFORNIA CIVIL PRACTICE, Procedure § 30:5 (2d ed. 1992) (detailing the means by which a creditor may
hale a debtor into court to discuss enforcement of a judgment).
6. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 708.110(d) (amended by Chapter 793); see id. § 415.10 (West Supp. 1993)
(describing the process of delivery for summons and complaints); see also SENATE COMMITrEE ON JUDICIARY,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 504, at 3 (June 22, 1993) (observing the need for personal delivery of orders upon
judgment creditors in light of the harsh penalties, including arrest and punishment for contempt, that they may
face by failing to appear). But see id. at 4 (addressing the concerns of the Litigation Section of the California
Bar over the increase in service costs Chapter 793 is likely to cause). See generally Lisa A. Wenger, Service of
Process and Other Papers, in I CALIFORNIA CIVIL PRACTICE, Procedure § 6:12 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing code
sections dealing with personal delivery).
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Budget Act of 1993, Item 0804-001-001 (amended); Code of Civil
Procedure §§ 1325, 1513.5, 1515, 1516, 1530, 1563, 1564
(amended).
AB 1854 (Cannella); 1993 STAT. Ch. 692
Existing law provides for the continuous appropriation' of all money
in the Unclaimed Property Fund2 and the Abandoned Property Account3
to the State Controller' for specified purposes.5 Existing law also
provides, however, that no funds other than those specifically enumerated6
may be appropriated, except by a Budget Act.7 Chapter 692 provides that
the funds in the Unclaimed Property Fund may be continuously
appropriated to the Controller, notwithstanding other statutory restrictions.8
Existing law provides that funds held by a life insurance corporation 9
under a policy 0  or contract" which has matured or terminated, 2 will
1. See 64 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 809, 812 (1981) (defining a continuous appropriation); see also CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 50400.5 (West 1986) (providing for continuous appropriation of various housing
loan funds of the Department of Housing); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4496.40(b) (West Supp. 1993) (providing for
continuous appropriation for funding for the construction of new correctional facilities); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE
§ 1521 (West 1986) (providing for continuous appropriation for the Unemployment Fund).
2. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1313 (West 1982) (establishing the Unclaimed Property Fund).
3. See id. § 1564 (amended by Chapter 692) (establishing the Abandoned Property Account as part of
the Unclaimed Property Fund).
4. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12412 (West 1992) (requiring the Controller to keep an account for each
separate appropriation).
5. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1325, 1564 (amended by Chapter 692); see id. (permitting, among other
things, continuous refund of overpayments and payment of claims against the account).
6. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 13340 (West Supp. 1993) (exempting any disbursement of sales tax, use
tax, and transaction proceeds to local governments pursuant to the California Revenue and Taxation Code §§
7200-7212, 7251-7274, and any scheduled disbursement of funds by an entity which issues bonds).
7. Id.; see CAL. CONsT. art. IV, § 12 (requiring the submission of the state budget by the governor
within the first 10 days of each calendar year, and the passage of the budget bill by the Legislature by June 15
of each year); see also Pratt v. Wilson, 770 F. Supp. 539, 543-44 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (declaring that the failure
of state officials to release funds for AFDC programs due to a budget impasse and the statutory restrictions of
California Government Code § 13340 was a violation of federal law and regulation).
8. CAL. CtV. PROC. CODE §§ 1325, 1564(b) (amended by Chapter 692); see SENATE COMMITTEE ON
INSURANCE, CLAIMS AND CORPORATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF A.B. 1854, at 2 (June 16, 1993) (stating
that the State Controller's office processes approximately 4,000 unclaimed property claims each month, and that
without continuous appropriation, any budget impasse would prevent many people from obtaining property to
which they are entitled under the Unclaimed Property Act).
9. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1501(0 (West Supp. 1993) (defining a life insurance corporation); see
also CAL. INS. CODE § 22 (,Vest 1993) (defining insurance as a contract in which one party undertakes to
indemnify another against loss from an unknown or contingent event); id. § 101 (Vest 1993) (defining life
insurance as including insurance upon annuities and lives).
10. See CAL. INS. CODE § 380 (West 1993) (defining a policy as the written instrument in which a
contract of insurance is set forth).
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escheat 13 to the state if unclaimed or unpaid for more than three years
after the funds become payable. 4 Existing law also provides that a life
insurance policy not matured by actual proof of death,' 5 is deemed
matured and the proceeds payable, under certain conditions, 6 providing
that no activity, as specified,1 7 occurs within a certain period of time.' 8
11. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1549 ("West 1982) (defining contract as an agreement to do or not do a certain
thing).
12. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10170 (West 1993) (describing when insurance upon life may be payable).
13. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1300(c) (West 1982) (defining escheat).
14. Id. § 1515(a) (amended by Chapter 692); see First Corp., Inc. v. County of Santa Clara, 146 Cal.
App. 3d 841, 847, 194 Cal. Rptr. 752, 755 (1983) (holding that property can escheat to the state, but not to a
local government); see also Estate of Supeck, 225 Cal. App. 3d 360, 366, 274 Cal. Rptr. 706, 710 (1990)
(reiterating a long-standing judicial principal that the law does not favor the escheat of property to the state);
Bank of America v. Kenneth Cory, 164 Cal. App. 3d 66, 74, 210 Cal. Rptr. 351, 355 (1985) (holding that the
California Unclaimed Property Law is not a true escheat statute, but has the dual purpose of returning property
to its owner and giving the state, rather than the holder, use of the unclaimed property); Petition of Abrams, 512
N.Y.S.2d 962, 966 (1986) (affirming that there is no federal right of escheat); cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2080.3
(Vest Supp. 1993) (providing that lost property retained by the police department shall be kept for 90 days prior
to its return to the finder); CAL. FIN. CODE § 1663 (Vest 1989) (providing that unclaimed safe deposit box
contents must be kept for two years before public sale on published notice); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1309 (West
1982) (providing that unclaimed bail shall be transferred to the general fund after three years); id. § 5061 (West
Supp. 1993) (providing that the unclaimed money and proceeds of sale of personal property of an inmate who
dies in a state institution shall be transferred to the Unclaimed Property Fund after one year); id. § 5062 (West
Supp. 1993) (providing that the unclaimed money of an inmate who escapes, or is discharged or paroled from
a state institution, will be transferred to the Unclaimed Property Fund after three years); CAL. PROB. CODE §§
6800-6806 (West 1991) (providing for the escheat to the state of the property of an intestate decedent who leaves
no one to take under the laws of intestate succession); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5561.5 (Vest 19S4) (requiring
that unclaimed property in the possession of a regional park district be held at least six months prior to sale at
a public auction); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 567.15(b)(viii) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that money due
under a policy of insurance is subject to the laws pertaining to unclaimed property if it has been unclaimed and
unpaid for five years).
15. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 5144 (West 1991) (defining proof of death as an original, attested or certified
copy of a death certificate, or any record or report that is prima facie evidence of death under California Health
and Safety Code § 10577, California Evidence Code §§ 1530-1532, or any other state statute).
16. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 1515(c)(1)-(2) (amended by Chapter 692) (providing that a life insurance
policy, not matured by proof of actual death, may be deemed to be matured if the insured has attained the
limiting age under the mortality table on which the policy is based, or the policy was in force at the time the
insured would have attained the limiting age); see also CAL. INS. CODE § 10489.2(a) (Vest Supp. 1993) (setting
forth the minimum standards for valuation of life insurance policies and describing appropriate mortality tables
for use in establishing such valuations).
17. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1515(c)(3) (amended by Chapter 692) (listing activities which will
prevent maturation of a policy not matured by actual proof of death as: (1) Assignment, readjustment, or
payment of premiums; (2) establishment of a loan on the policy; or (3) correspondence with the insurance
corporation regarding the policy).
18. Id. § 1515(c) (amended by Chapter 692). Prior law required the passage of five years under specified
conditions before a policy, not matured by actual proof of death, was deemed matured. 1990 Cal. Legis. Serv.
ch. 450, sec. 7, at 1589 (amending CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1515).
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Chapter 692 reduces the period of inactivity required for maturation of a
policy not matured by actual proof of death to three years.19
Existing law provides that any intangible interest2 ° in a business
association escheats to the state after three years, under specified
conditions.22 Chapter 692 establishes additional requirements for notice23
which must be given to such interest holders before the interest may
escheat to the state.24
Existing law provides that securities25 listed on an established stock
exchange which escheat to the state, must be sold at the prevailing price
on that exchange. 26 Chapter 692 provides that such securities must be
sold within one year of their receipe 7 by the Controller.28
CAS
19. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1515(c)(3) (amended by Chapter 692); cf. D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-207 (Supp.
1993) (stating that a policy which is matured without proof of actual death escheats to the state after five years
of inactivity); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 653(c)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that a policy which is
matured without proof of actual death escheats to the state after two years of inactivity).
20. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1516(b) (amended by Chapter 692) (describing an intangible interest
as an interest evidenced by stock or membership records).
21. See id. § 1501(c) (West Supp. 1993) (defining business association).
22. Id. § 1516 (amended by Chapter 692); see id. § 1516(b) (amended by Chapter 692) (providing for
escheat of such interest if the owner has not claimed a dividend or other sum owing, corresponded with the
association, or otherwise indicated an interest, and if the business association is unaware of the location of the
owner).
23. See id. § 1516(d) (amended by Chapter 692) (requiring the association to give notice by mail to the
owner not less than six months nor more than twelve months prior to the time the interest will escheat to the
state, and to provide the owner with a form by which the owner can confirm his or her current address, and
specifying that if the form is signed and returned, the escheat provisions will not operate); cf. N.Y. ABAND.
PROP. LAW. § 501.2.b(iii) (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1993) (requiring notice of potential escheat be given to
shareholders during the calendar year prior to the year in which the security will escheat).
24. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1516 (amended by Chapter 692).
25. See id. § 1360(c) (West 1982) (defining securities).
26. Id. § 1563(b) (amended by Chapter 692).
27. See CAL. COM. CODE § 1201(14) (West Supp. 1993) (defining delivery for Uniform Commercial
Code purposes as the voluntary transfer of possession); see id. § 2103 (West 1964) (defining receipt for Uniform
Commercial Code-Sales purposes as the taking of physical possession).
28. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1563 (amended by Chapter 692); see SENATE COMMITTEE ON INSURANCE,
CLAIMS, AND CORPORATIONS, CommITrEE ANALYSIS OF A.B. 1854, at 3 (June 16, 1993) (explaining that the
1992-93 state budget required sale within one year of all securities held in the Unclaimed Property Fund, and
stating the Controller's belief that such an ongoing practice would decrease workload and increase General Fund
revenues); cf. N.Y. ABAND. PROP. LAW § 1403.1-a (McKinney Supp. 1993) (requiring securities to be sold as
soon as practicable, and amending a 1991 version of the law to eliminate a previous requirement that securities
be sold within 15 months of receipt).
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